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ABSTRACT 
Political success in semi-democratic countries has two aspects: shifting the balance of power in 
one’s favor and maintaining it. This thesis seeks to examine how the AKP has succeeded in 
shifting the balance of power in its favor while its predecessor the Welfare Party did not. 
Focusing on electoral success, existing research primarily lists center-periphery conflict, 
moderation, class struggle, party organization, and failures of others as the main determinants. 
Yet the significance of reining in the power of the Kemalist state structure has been mostly 
disregarded. Therefore, with a comparison of the AKP (2002-2007) and the Welfare Party (1996-
1997) governments, this study tests one assertion using most-similar systems research design that 
in semi-democratic political settings with strong authoritarian actors, political parties that build 
broad coalitions via group specific policy promises will be more likely to shift the balance of 
power in favor of themselves than actors that lack such connections. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“The others are all collaborators,” decried Necmettin Erbakan in his 1994 local election 
speech, “They are all imitators of the West, the Zionists. Vote for Refah (Welfare Party), and let 
us spoil their game!” Just Order, which was based on a pragmatic mixture of capitalism, 
Communism, and Islam, was presented as the only solution to the chronic problems of Turkey. 
The ongoing economic crisis, reported as the most damaging one in the history of the 
Republic, was on top of that obstinate list. “In the first quarter of 1994, the Turkish Lira (TL) 
was devalued more than 50% against the US dollar, the Central Bank lost half of its reserves, 
interest rates skyrocketed (with 400%), and the inflation rate reached three-digit levels.1” A 
stabilization program, later supported by an IMF Stand-By was launched on April 5th, 1994, but 
the structural adjustment measures only deepened the crisis. First, real wages fell sharply: 
“average nominal wage increases of 65 percent were about 20 percent below the rate of 
consumer price inflation2”. Later, due to rapid privatization of public enterprises, the slowdown 
in government spending, and a sharp loss in business confidence, almost half a million people 
lost their jobs3. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to speculate that the economic hardship might have been 
overlooked –or at least tolerated more quietly-, had not the monetary scandals of high-rank state 
officials –and even Prime Minister Tansu Ciller herself- broke out one after another during the 
same time period. It was quite obvious that the burden of the economic crisis, and the structural 
adjustment program was not shared by every segment of the society. And, as a result, the popular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/kriz.pdf	  2	  http://sinestezi.wordpress.com/2009/04/04/turkiye-de-ekonomik-krizler-1994-1998-1999-ve-2001-krizleri/ 3	  http://sinestezi.wordpress.com/2009/04/04/turkiye-de-ekonomik-krizler-1994-1998-1999-ve-2001-krizleri/	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frustration ascended day by day as a reaction to the corruption, mismanagement of the crisis, and 
incompetence of the government. 
Even worse, every path for channeling that frustration peacefully was either completely 
blocked or limited by an imperious military authority. The ongoing fighting in the east of the 
country between separatist Kurdish guerrillas and Turkish army was getting more intense every 
day, and since half of the country was being ruled under the state of emergency, the political 
space for the men in the uniform was expanding day by day. As the country was going through 
“those days that unity and solidarity of the nation were needed, above all”, “whining” about 
democracy or economic situation was intolerable. As a result, torture, death under custody, 
disappearance (mostly under custody), murders whose perpetrators were unknown became the 
norm due to the security-centric state ideology. 
Sauced with a heavy Islamist rhetoric, Just Order was perceived as the light at the end of 
the tunnel in this atmosphere. The Party promised that there would be neither the oppressor nor 
the oppressed in the new system. The Kurdish problem, the privatization problem, the economic 
problems, the corruption problem, and even the traffic problem could be solved via Islamist way 
of governing. This call found a broad audience from the frustrated and oppressed lower classes 
as much as conservative middle class, and the Welfare Party increased its vote share from 9.8% 
(1989) to 19.10% (1994 local elections) in 5 years. At its peak, Welfare Party got 21.37% in the 
1995 general elections, and for the first time in the history of Turkey, political Islam became the 
partner of a ruling coalition. 
Despite its electoral success and popular support, the ruling of the Welfare Party lasted 
only for a year. The Party was first forced out of power by the military, and then shut down 
completely by the Constitutional Court due to its hidden “reactionary” agenda. Along with the 
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marginalization of the Welfare Party, a strict de-Islamization process swept the society. Known 
as 28 February process -regarding 28 February 1995 National Security Council decisions that are 
considered to be the basis of a post-modern coup d’etat- this upgraded Turkish McCarthyism 
turned into a total witch hunt against practicing Muslims in the public sphere. 
Therefore, the landslide victory of the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) in 2002 general 
elections shocked the country not only because the Party “had been established merely 15 
months before the elections and [its] president had been in jail some time ago for publicly 
reciting a poem” (Isik & Pinarcioglu, 2010, p.161), but also because its cadre mostly consisted of 
former Welfare Party members. 
This victory quickly revived a huge scholarly and intellectual debate on the determinants 
of election victory of the AKP, and the resurgence of the political Islam in Turkey. Not 
surprisingly, the memoirs of the Welfare government revisited, and the AKP’s survival 
possibility as a ruling party – and as a political party in general- became the subject of 
conversation all over the country. 
Contrary to the expectations of some and fears of others, the AKP has not only been able 
to survive three general and two local elections, but also to increase its vote shares in each and 
every election[4].  In a country accustomed to military and/or judiciary interferences to 
government, the AKP was not exempt from assaults of the Kemalist state structure. During its 
ten year rule, AKP fought against the very same state structure that had dismissed the Welfare 
Party and many other governments while trying to convince the domestic and international 
forces that the Party was not a threat to secularism per se. When the tension reached its peak with 
an online military memorandum on April 27, 2007, the AKP was unexpectedly able to repulse 
the military, announce early elections, and consolidate its rule with another election victory 
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shortly after the memorandum. This was a historic moment for Turkish politics since it was the 
first time that a government resisted the ultimatum of the military, and managed to hold on to 
power in spite of it. 
Why did not AKP share the same destiny with the Welfare Party although high-rank 
generals were implying such an end? How has the AKP managed to appease the Kemalist state 
structure and shift the balance of power in favor of itself while its predecessor the Welfare Party 
did not? 
This puzzle is of more than passing historical interest of Turkish politics. Defeating 
authoritarian regimes -transition to democracy- has long been debated among scholars of 
democratization. 
The sharp -yet smooth- balance of power change in Turkish politics in recent years might 
shed light on the path for other illiberal democracies that have a powerful authoritarian actor 
besides democratic institutions, or those that have a limited democratic setting. In a region with 
burgeoning electoral success of Islamist parties with the fall of authoritarian leaders one after 
another, the AKP experience could also be used as a reference point by the optimists to show that 
the political agenda of the Islamist parties could be shaped, contained, and transformed by the 
broad social coalition they depend on to survive, which eventually helps them weaken the 
authoritarian structures that are strongly rooted in these countries. 
Hence, it is no surprise that the case of the AKP has attracted a vast scholarly interest 
from political science, sociology, and history for over a decade. Overwhelmed by the sensational 
election victories of the AKP, the literature has unfortunately focused its attention solely on this 
phenomena, and come up with different answers; 
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1.     Center-periphery conflict: Top-down modernization –especially secularization- 
promoted the polarization of the Turkish society, and spurred a struggle between the center –the 
Kemalist elites- and the periphery –the Muslim population. As the periphery got stronger 
economically and ideologically after the acceptance of neo-liberalism in 1980s, its political 
influence began to ascend as well. The AKP’s success, therefore, was just a reflection of this 
resurgence of the periphery that changed the balance of power between the Kemalist elites and 
the Islamic masses. 
2.     Political Learning/moderation: The political learning process that the leaders of the 
Party have been through has played a significant role in moderation of its political agenda and 
rhetoric. And as a result of this moderation, the Party managed to appeal to a broader 
constituency. 
3.     Class struggle: The point of convergence for the scholars of political economy has 
largely been the emergence of a new conservative bourgeoisie as a product of the economic and 
political liberalization of 1980s and 1990s. In consonance with this view, scholars have 
contended that there is a class struggle between the traditional upper-middle class and the new 
middle classes in Turkey since 1980s, and the AKP owes its success very much to this conflict. 
4.     Party organization/mobilization: According to these scholars, the AKP’s 
unparalleled focus on grassroots voter mobilization, it systematical operation, and autonomy 
have cleared the path for election victories, and given rise to the Party. 
5.     Failures of others: A group of scholars offered a new perspective, and tried to find 
an answer to the question of why others failed instead of why the AKP succeeded. They 
contended that it was not necessarily the success of the AKP, but mostly the failures of center 
right and social left parties in finding a solution to the economic sufferings of the masses. Not 
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surprisingly, they argued that economic parameters were determinant for the voting behavior of 
the Turkish constituency. 
6.     Group Specific Policy Promises: What has been mostly overlooked by the literature 
is the fact that electoral success in-and-of itself may not be sufficient for explaining the survival 
of the AKP vis-à-vis the Kemalist state structure, since the predecessor of the AKP –the Welfare 
Party- was dismissed by the very same structure in spite of its 1994 and 1995 election victories. 
Therefore, I believe that this puzzle cannot be analyzed properly without changing our 
perspective on what we understand as “success”. My perspective suggests that success, 
especially in semi-democratic contexts, refers to first reining in the power of the authoritarian 
actor(s) and shifting the balance of power in the political sphere in favor of oneself, and then 
maintaining/consolidating the new power balance. In other words, “success”, as it is used in this 
study, encapsulates both the political survival and the actual dominance of the party. 
First of all, such a perspective offers a more demanding standard than sole electoral 
success, since in limited democratic settings elections can be used for a variety of reasons other 
than determining the actual ruler of the country. In fact, scholars argue that authoritarian actors 
use elections for systematic practical reasons such as gaining legitimacy in international arena 
(Schwedler & Chomiak, 2006) or appeasing the challengers from both within the ruling elite 
(Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi&Przeworski, 2007), and the society (Gandhi&Prezeworski, 
2007; Lust-Okar, 2004; Schwedler, 1998; Brumberg, 2002). Moderating radical opposition 
groups have also considered to be another motive for holding elections in authoritarian regimes 
(Schwedler, 1998; Brumberg, 2002; Gandhi&Przeworski, 2007; Berman, 2008). 
However, it is important to note that these semi-democratic political settings strongly 
differ from façade or pseudo-democracies by offering four arenas to challenge the regime: “the 
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electoral, the legislature, the media and the judicial,” and therefore elections are not used merely 
for window dressing. Elections provide a front for challenging the existing balance of power, but 
one needs to take into account other fronts as well in order to win the battle. 
Second, this new perspective takes into account the existence of various power centers in 
the Turkish society, and builds on their struggle over social control while analyzing the shift of 
power balance in the political sphere. This conflict, based on each groups’ value sets, preferences 
or interests, played an underappreciated role in changing the balance of power that dominates the 
Turkish society. 
I argue that in this environment of struggle, the broad coalition of democracy seeking 
groups –each for its own sake- has managed to weaken the authoritarian state structure 
comprised of military, judiciary and bureaucracy. However, this coalition was not an ipso facto 
aggregation of different groups for a “greater good.” Rather, it was the product of a deliberate 
AKP strategy that aimed to attain the political power essential for the appeasement of the 
Kemalist state structure, and the establishment of its own domination. That strategy, I believe, 
was winning over different power centers in the society via particularistic policy promises. 
In sum, deriving explanations from a larger literature on group-specific politics, and the 
seminal study of Joel Migdal’s state-in-society approach, this study suggest that AKP’s strategy 
of providing group-specific policy promises can be one of the underappreciated aspects that may 
have promoted the success of the Party –not only in terms of winning elections per se, but also in 
terms of shifting the balance of power in the political sphere in favor of itself. 
After presenting the literature on the rise of the AKP/Islamist in Turkish politics, we offer 
particularistic politics as an alternative explanation, and draw the boundaries of the term as it is 
used in this study by providing a brief summary of the discussions on particularistic vs. 
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universalistic politics in Chapter 2. Later, I contend that Joel Migdal’s state-in-society approach, 
which delineates the state as a web of multiple power loci struggling for social domination, 
presents a proper context for the viability and acceptability of such an explanation. I argue that in 
a context in which multiple power centers struggle with one another for social control, actors 
using group-specific policy promises will be more likely to successfully change the balance of 
power than actors that lack such connections. Relating this general hypothesis to my research 
question, I assert that that the AKP has been successful in appeasing the Kemalist state structure 
and shifting the balance of power in favor of itself; because it was able to build a broad coalition 
consisting of various power centers in the society via providing group-specific policy promises 
to each, whereas the Welfare Party lacked such connections. 
In Chapter 3, I clarify the contents of the Kemalist state structure, and reveal my research 
design for analyzing the correlation –if any- between the AKP’s group-specific policy promises 
(IV) and its success in shifting the balance of power in favor of itself (DV). Chapter 4 tests my 
hypothesis with a most-similar research design with the AKP and the Welfare Party at its focus. 
2. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
2.1.CENTER – PERIPHERY CONFLICT 
Most scholars studying Turkish politics believe that the primary factor that has shaped 
Turkish society and politics for decades is the modernization process, which dates back to 
Tanzimat reforms (1839) of Ottoman Empire, and takes a more radical and transformative stance 
with the founding of the Turkish Republic (Onis, 1997; Ozbudun, 1981; Kalaycioglu, 1994; Isik 
& Pinarcioglu, 2010). More than any other scholar, Serif Mardin, in his 1973 book Center and 
Periphery: A Key to Turkish Politics?,  makes the case that Turkish society has always had a 
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center and a periphery. According to Mardin, Ottomans used Islam –the majority religion of the 
era- as a communication tool that tied these otherwise very loosely related worlds together 
(Mardin, 1973). Modernization, on the other hand, cut that connection between the central elites 
and peripheral forces and created “the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish 
politics” (Mardin, 1973, p.170). 
Modernization process had such traumatic effects for state-society relations because 
bureaucratic elites were convinced that Islam was an obstacle to development and modernization 
of the state, and therefore it had to be wiped out of the society through a top-down reform 
process. As a result, “the Republican elite bodied in the Republican People’s Party –the single 
party through which Republican policies were channeled- was unable to establish contact with 
the rural masses.” (Mardin, 1973, p.183). Modeling the French system, the strict secularization 
process in Turkey was more about subordinating religion to the political realm than separating it 
from the state. Combined with harsh punishments, the authoritarian secularism further 
“promoted the polarization of Islam and the struggle between Kemalists and Muslims for control 
of the state,” (Yavuz, 1997, p.64) – a struggle usually resulted in the triumph of the Kemalist 
elites due to their monopoly of political, economic, and military power. 
Contrary to earlier literature, Ramin Ahmadow (2008) argues that the social and political 
structure of Turkey, namely this center-periphery tension between Kemalists and Islamists has 
dramatically changed after 1980s (Ahmadov, 2008). The role of the 1980 military in this 
transformation was decisive, since “the leaders of the military coup, ironically, depended on 
Islamic institutions and symbols for legitimization; fusing Islamic ideas with national goals, they 
hoped to create a more homogenous and less political Islamic community,” (Yavuz, 1997, p.67). 
“In this transformation process,” contends Ahmadov, “though the macro structure of society was 
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preserved and the center and periphery continued to co-exist, the power balance between the two 
has changed,” (Ahmadov, 2008, p.18). As a result, “the periphery recovered, produced its own 
world with its own market and financial networks, grew its elite, and re-defined its worldview 
with respect to its central beliefs and traditions,” (Ahmadov, 2008, p.18) - a transformation 
which left Turkish center no option but to defend the status quo at any cost, even if it meant 
supporting military coups.  Islamists, on the other hand, demanded more and more liberalism in 
order to extend the sphere of influence of the peripheral masses they are representing. In final 
analysis, “these developments set the stage for a paradoxical switching of roles: progressive 
Islamists versus reactionary Kemalists,” (Gunter & Yavuz, 2007, p.290) 
In addition to the change in the balance of power between center and periphery, the 1980s 
contributed to the addition of new battlefields that new wars could be fought. Isik and 
Pinarcioglu (2010) claim that with the introduction of the neoliberal policies and increasing 
urbanization, the center-periphery tension transferred to urban areas, and transformed into a new 
tension between the well-educated rich and the less-educated poor. Taking over the heritage of 
the once powerful center-right, Islamist parties have become the spokesperson for these newly 
established peripheral areas. 
Either the secular and West-oriented center vs. the religious and traditional periphery or 
the modern urban vs. rural conflicts, the tension between two opposing worlds is still “the most 
salient axis of political divisions in Turkey.” (Isik & Pinarcioglu, 2010, p.178). That’s why the 
election victory of AKP –the last representative of the periphery- was correctly labeled as the 
“Anatolian4 revolution5” initiating the “Second Republic6” by the mainstream media organs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Aside from its geographical meaning, “Anatolia” represents the periphery in Turkish society.	  5	  http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2002/11/04/ 04/17/2012 6	  http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2002/11/24/ 04/17/2012	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Even if we accept that this dichotomy presents useful insights for explaining the electoral 
success of the Islamist parties in Turkish politics, it is hardly that helpful in addressing the 
distinction between the Welfare Party and the AKP with regards to the origins of their strengths 
and weaknesses as well as their political agenda.  The center-periphery arguments fail to answer 
why the Welfare Party used a heavy Islamic rhetoric while AKP refrained from it and 
emphasized the importance of democratization. 
In addition to that, the center-periphery dichotomy overlooks the disparate between the 
ruling experiences of these two peripheral parties vis-à-vis the center –or namely the Kemalist 
state structure. Contrary to the “representative of the same periphery” thesis, the characteristic 
and the life span of the Islamist governments entirely differed from one another. While the 
Welfare Party was forced out of power with a post-modern military coup –aka 28 February 
process, AKP has been able to stay in power with an increasing strength albeit the efforts of the 
Kemalist state structure, surviving the 27 April Military Memorandum. Why would that be the 
case if the same constituency against the same enemy supported both? 
2.2.POLITICAL LEARNING / MODERATION 
Another group of scholars emphasized the apparent difference between the party 
programs, policy goals, rhetoric, and constituency support of the parties in explaining the AKP’s 
success and the Welfare’s failure vis-à-vis Kemalists. In fact, they argued, AKP has been 
successful because the Party refrained from making references to religion – a sharp contrast with 
the previous Islamist parties (Cavdar, 2006). Thereby, “despite the Party’s Islamist heritage, 
AKP targeted a broad constituency, cutting cross-class, gender, and ethnic lines, and gained the 
support of those who previously had voted for central right and Islamist parties,” (Cavdar, 2006, 
p.479). 
 12 
This moderation was not a sudden invention of the AKP, but rather was the result of a 
“political learning” process, which was deeply rooted in the experiences of its cadres in the 
Islamist movement, and the lessons they derived from the unpleasant end of the Welfare Party. 
Scholars define political learning as “a process through which people modify their 
political beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crises, frustrations, and dramatic changes in 
environment” which is usually forced by structural constraints (Bermeo, 1992, p.274). Carrot and 
stick policies as well as regime accommodations such as democratic openings have been 
essential for moderation of the radical opposition leaders in order to exploit the opportunity of 
inclusion to the system (Bermeo, 1992; Wickham, 2004; Yilmaz, 2008, Somer, 2007). 
Hammered by the previous experiences of Islamist movement vis-à-vis these structural 
constraints –namely the authoritarian Kemalist state structure and the unique position of 
European Union regarding democratization-, “the top [AK] Party leadership came to 
acknowledge that any attempt to increase the influence of Islam in Turkish politics, let alone any 
radical changes in domestic or foreign policy, were bound to be blocked” (Cavdar, 2006, p.481). 
Therefore, a radical transformation of the state was impossible in Turkish context. Instead, “what 
was desirable and feasible, they believed, was to seek greater religious freedoms within the 
parameters of a secular and democratic political system,” (Cavdar, 2006, p.481). Moreover, 
moderation would also help them broaden their constituency support as they became aware that 
the Turkish society was against the obstinate confrontation with the secular state structure 
(Cavdar, 2007). In short, following the Welfare legacy was a political suicide in every means. 
Such a shift from Islamism to post-Islamism7- and even to non-Islamism8- has put 
moderation at the heart of the AKP’s political posture and practices: respect to Ataturk and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Post-Islamism: “A form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue 
political objectives…[which] provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the 
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secularism was consistently emphasized by Party members, female candidates were chosen from 
among those who did not wear headscarves, the EU membership was listed as one of the 
priorities, headscarf, and IHL9 problems, the core demands of the conservative electoral base10, 
were postponed to an indefinite future. And consequently, this unprecedented de-Islamization of 
the Party –a virtue the Welfare Party apparently lacked- promoted its success vis-à-vis the 
secular state structure. After all, “for Kemalists, radical Islam [has been] easier to vilify and to 
justify restricting within democracy” as “moderate Islam’s zeal to embrace modern lifestyles and 
its rejection of revolutionary methods make it harder to justify restricting it within a democratic 
system,” (Somer, 2007, p.1277). 
Nevertheless, even if we overlook the similarities of the AKP and the Welfare Party on 
gender, and foreign policy practices, and accept that moderation argument does account for their 
divergent destinies, the failure of other moderate Islamist parties that were not nearly as 
successful as the AKP still begs an explanation. 
 After the Welfare Party ousted from power, the reformers that were going to found AKP 
in upcoming years were not the only fraction to realize that avoiding open confrontation with the 
Kemalist state structure was the only way to succeed (Yilmaz, 2008). The Virtue Party, which 
was founded by traditionalist Welfare cadres after they realized that the closure of the Welfare 
Party became imminent, also refrained from using religious rhetoric to an extent that its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
foundations for which rests on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition,” (Denoeux, 
2002, p.61) cited in (Yilmaz, 2008, p.45). 
8	  “From the beginning, the AKP claimed that their party is not Islamist; they even rejected the use of the label 
“Muslim democrats” as an analogy to the Christian democrats in Western Europe. In rejecting the label “Muslim 
democrat”, Erdogan stated that: ‘These attributions are not correct, not because we are not Muslims or democrats; 
but because these two [identities] should be considered on different planes’. Rather, the AKP based its policies on 
the “conservative democracy” program. Instead of emphasizing their Muslim identity, they preferred to ground their 
moral and religious values within the confines of ‘conservatism’.” (Ayata & Tutuncu, 2008, p. 367).	  
9	  Imam Hatip Schools – Vocational schools that pursue an Islamic curriculum in addition to the national one 
containing arts and sciences.	  
10	  Hayrettin Karaman, Iktidarin Uc Mesele ile Imtihani Yeni Safak Newspaper 
http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/eylul/09/hkaraman.html 05/20/12	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discourse became very similar to that of a center-right economically liberal and socially 
conservative party, (Yilmaz, 2008). The Virtue Party also “advocated pluralism and the 
democratization of everyday values in order to democratize politics, abandoning the nationalist 
and state-oriented model of economy preached by Erbakan for decades, in favor of free-market 
economy with an emphasis on social justice. The VP also renounced anti-Westernism and 
embraced European Union membership, previously thought to be a Jewish conspiracy by the 
Welfare Party and its Islamist predecessors (Yildiz, 2003). 
  In short, even though the Virtue Party went through the same political learning process 
as the AKP, this moderation did not carry it to power, nor did it prevent the Constitutional Court 
from banning it in 2001 due to its violation of the Kemalist articles of the Constitution. 
2.3.CLASS STRUGGLE  
Deviating from the analysis based on traditional “center-periphery” conflict, some 
scholars contend that class struggle lies at the heart of the ideological and cultural tensions in 
Turkey in general, and the rise of the AKP in particular. According to these scholars, what is 
disguised as an Islamist-Kemalist conflict is nothing more than a struggle between Anatolian 
bourgeoisie (embodied in Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association – MUSIAD) 
and Istanbul’s large businesses (embodied in Turkish Industry and Business Association –
TUSIAD) to get larger shares from the expanding economic pie (Onis, 1997; Meyer, 1999; 
Gulalp, 1999; Cavdar, 2006; Alam, 2009; Baskan, 2010; Sen, 2010). Consequently, each class 
supports the political parties that could be a perfect spokesperson for their economic interests. 
After all, the scholars argue, ideology matters only to an extent in an environment in 
which there are alternative players that could represent the same ideology. Therefore, the 
Anatolian bourgeoisie has not been inclined to support the Islamist parties only because of their 
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ideological proximity. Endowed with genuine entrepreneurial spirit as much as religious and 
national values, MUSIAD members believed that they were “excluded from the economic life 
controlled by big business groups supported by Kemalist state, [which] allocated investment 
funds and other privileges largely to Kemalists and Westernized big business groups –the 
Istanbul bourgeoisie- [that are] state-protected, monopolistic, and rent-seeking,” (Sen, 2010, 
p.74). Accordingly, what gave rise to the AKP was the marriage between neoliberalism and 
Turkish Islamism that promised benefits to the new business elite. 
This explanation is problematic in several aspects. First, the AKP was not the first 
Islamist party to enjoy this support. During the 1980’s, the Welfare Party as well voiced the 
interests of burgeoning Anatolian bourgeoisie who wished to receive state support and protection 
like their Istanbul counterparts (Gulalp, 2001; Meyer, 1999; Baskan, 2010). “The rise of the 
Welfare Party reflects,” argued Ziya Onis, “the growing aspirations of the rising Islamic 
bourgeoisie to consolidate their position in society, to achieve elite status also and, in purely 
economic terms, to obtain a greater share of public resources, both at the central and local levels, 
in competition with other segments of private business in Turkey,” (Onis, p.760). Nevertheless, 
the support of the Anatolian bourgeoisie did not prevent the fall of the Welfare Party. Quite the 
contrary, the conservative entrepreneurs themselves got harmed by being labeled as 
“unfavorable” and “reactionary” during 28 February process (Yavuz, 1997).   
Second, TUSIAD, the very same organization that is claimed to be clashing with 
MUSIAD- and consequentially the AKP, has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the 
AKP. In this regard, Mehmet Ugur and Dilek Yankaya observe that “[the] awareness of the 
significance of credible commitments to reform and the explicit linkage between the reform 
process and EU conditionality (…) brought TUSIAD into close cooperation with the Justice and 
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Development Party,” (2008, p. 590). In fact, “TUSIAD [itself] tended to describe the AKP 
government as an opportunity for economic and political stability and for economic and social 
transformation that the country had been longing for,” (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.593). 
2.4. PARTY ORGANIZATION / MOBILIZATION 
Studies addressing the links between electorate mobilization and the AKP’s success have 
primarily placed stress on party organization. Some scholars argue that forming grassroots 
organizations that build direct bridges with the large segments of society –especially those 
adversely affected by the outcomes of the globalization- is the main reason behind the Party’s 
landslide victory (Tugal, 2009). Others emphasize the role of “the party’s character as an 
organization, its internal power structure, its electoral roots, strategy, and leadership in the 
context of [the Party’s] organizational environment –including its constitution, major veto 
players as well as international actors,” in determining not only the electoral success but also the 
survival possibility of the AKP (Boyraz, 2010, p.287; Kumbaracibasi, 2009).  
After all, parties do not act in a vacuum, the argument follows, the interaction between 
internal life of a party (being systematic) and its organizational environment (its autonomy) is of 
significant importance (Kumbaracibasi, 2009). Accordingly, “the survival [of the AKP] as a 
major political force” will depend on “balancing the AKP’s roots in Islamic parties and 
movements against its claims to be a moderate party far from radicalism and fundamentalism,” 
(Kumbaracibasi, 2009, p.4). 
However, such explanations overlook the fact that the Welfare Party’s rapid ascent in 
1990’s was also considered to be due to “its populist platforms and aggressive recruitment 
campaign [as well as] the Party’s unique internal discipline and impressive organizational 
strengths,” (Kamrava, 1998, p.292). In other words, the Welfare Party stood out as a party with 
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unprecedented cohesion, unity, and a well developed administrative organization (Yavuz, 1997). 
And yet, its organizational capabilities and mobilization success did not translate into the ability 
to govern when confronted by the secularist state structure.  
2.5. FAILURES OF OTHERS  
In spite of the vast literature studying the dynamics behind the AKP’s landslide victory, a 
number of scholars posit that it is not the success of the AKP per se but the failures of the major 
parties of the center-right and center-left that could explain “the first stage of a structural 
transformation in center politics” (Cosar & Ozman, 2004, p.57, Carkoglu, 2002). 
Integrating nationalist, conservative, liberal and social democratic tendencies, the AKP 
leadership aims to transcend the ideological borders and appeal to the broader center-right 
constituency (Cosar &Ozman, 2004; Taskin, 2008; Alam, 2009). In this vein, the AKP’s self-
identification itself of “conservative democrat” and distancing itself from the Islamist legacy in 
Turkey, as well as its distinctive efforts for EU membership, are not natural consequences of 
political learning. Rather they are “a part of a deliberate strategy of filling the void on the center-
right…. in responding to the ontological crisis deepened by the destabilizing effects of 
globalization, civil war, and unregulated urbanization,” (Taskin, 2008, p.53-54). 
But how did center-right politics, which represented no less than 50%11 of the Turkish 
electorates during 1990’s, fail in Turkey?  Taskin (2008) argues that the answer lies in the 
systematic corruption combined with the failure of two center-right parties (the Motherland and 
the True Path Party) to integrate the rising Muslim counter-elites into conservative 
modernization process, which promises economic development without moral decay. In addition, 
increased cooperation with the military and the secular establishment further distanced these two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/GenelSecimler.html 04/24/12	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parties from their populist claim of authentic representation of the masses (Cosar & Ozman, 
2004; Alam, 2009). 
On the other hand, economic factors also have significant implication for party politics in 
explaining the decline of the center-right politics in Turkey. For example, Kalaycioglu observes 
that since “there is more than one political party that occupies a particular ideological position of 
the left-right spectrum, the voter needs to make a further choice between ideological similarity of 
identical parties,” (Kalaycioglu, 2010, p.31). Similarly, Baslevent et. al (2005), provides 
evidence in support of economic voting hypothesis[2], which basically argues that incumbent 
parties will be in a disadvantaged position at this point, since voters hold the incumbent party 
responsible for economic indicators such as inflation, unemployment and GNP per capita –real 
or perceived-, and punish the government in elections. Likewise, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
contend that “Among the issues on the typical voter’s agenda, none is more consistently present, 
nor generally has a stronger impact, than the economy. Citizen dissatisfaction with economic 
performance substantially increases the probability of a vote against the incumbent.,” (Lewis-
Beck & Stegmaier, 2000, p.211). 
Thus, the fall of a government seems to be more likely to come from economic 
accountability than the shifts in ideological or political attachments (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 
2000). Even though, this effect has been considered asymmetrical, with mostly punishment and 
little reward (Radcliff, 1994), Kalaycioglu (2010) finds out that “partisan affiliations followed by 
the voter satisfaction with the performance of the economy played the biggest role in 
determining the voter preferences in Turkey in 2007 elections,” (p.29). 
Either symmetrical or asymmetrical, there is a consensus in the literature that the 
performance of the economy has a direct impact on the failure or the success of a government. 
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The dimension and the nature of the impact, on the other hand, are quite controversial. 
Nevertheless, what is not controversial is  “incumbents pay the price for short-term economic 
setbacks, but deeper crises may be translated into broader political shifts,” especially in 
developing countries (Remmer, 1991). Accordingly, some scholars argue that these “broader 
political shifts” mean the breakdowns of democratic or semi-democratic regimes (O’Donnell, 
1973; Linz, 1978; Collier, 1979; Gasirowski, 1995), while others contend that economic setbacks 
have a catalyst effect in triggering transitions to democracy (O’Donnell, Schmitter, & 
Whitehead, 1986; Bermeo, 1990; Przeworski, 1986). 
Either way, it can be derived from the literature that the worse the economy fails, the 
more radical the political change will be. By weakening the old actors and/or giving rise to new 
ones, economic crises create a chaotic atmosphere in the system. Thus, the argument indicates 
that economic parameters that hindered the power of the incumbent parties enabled the electoral 
victory of the AKP. 
What might be an interesting research question for future research is whether we could 
attribute the consecutive electoral victories of the AKP to the miracle developments in Turkish 
economy under the AKP government. Is it possible that the political success of the Party is just a 
reflection of its economic success?  
Putting aside the debates on the symmetrical and asymmetrical effects of the economic 
parameters on voting behavior, and the uneven distribution of wealth under the AKP rule, it 
should be kept in mind that governments do not necessarily come and –especially- go with 
elections in semi-democratic political settings such as Turkey. Therefore, the economic success 
might not tell us much about the containment of Kemalist elites, which consistently intervenes 
the democratic processes on ideological rather than economic grounds. After all, the military has 
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never addressed the poor economic performance of governments as a legitimizing factor for its 
interruptions. 
3. GROUP SPECIFIC POLICIES 
Despite the valuable contributions they make to the literature on the rise of the AKP, 
existing explanations suffer from two major weaknesses. First, most scholars take election 
victory as the ultimate indicator of success. Even though it might be a useful proxy in fully 
democratic political settings, where the elected government becomes the actual ruler of the 
country, elections do not necessarily determine who dominates the society in semi-democratic 
settings such as Turkey. Deeply rooted in the state structure, strong authoritarian actors in these 
political settings do not refrain from interfering with democratic institutions whenever they feel 
the need for the reproduction of their authority. Therefore, elections become an insufficient 
platform for the challenger that wishes to dominate the society according to its political agenda 
for establishing its rule prerequisites changing the status quo first. 
But if not for determining the actual ruler of the country, what is the purpose of 
elections in these limited democratic settings? Scholars argue that authoritarian actors use 
elections for systematic practical reasons that can be summarized in two categories: external and 
internal factors: 
External factors: To be recognized as a respectful member of the international 
community, the virtues of equality, the rule of law, human rights and freedoms as well as the 
liberal economy are supposed to be internalized by states. The countries that have problems in at 
least one of these are imposed, encouraged and even forced to reconsider their attitude 
(Huntington, 1991). Moreover, to get financial aid from IMF, World Bank, the United States or 
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the European Union, responding to foreign pressure and gaining legitimacy in the international 
arena has become crucial for the autocracies. if they manage to reflect this international 
pressure on to domestic opposition, they have a chance of pressuring the further moderation of 
the opposition (Schwedler & Chomiak, 2006; Berman, 2008). 
Internal factors: The internal reasons to have electoral institutions are as important as the 
external ones. Since the strength of an autocrat is not limitless, even the cruelest one cannot 
repress or kill every single opponent to his power. Thus, autocratic regimes should compromise 
one way or another to the challengers from both within the ruling elite and the society. 
The solution to the challenges coming from other ruling elites or noble family members 
could be conciliated by redistribution of the state patronage. The most efficient way for an 
autocrat to decide who should be spoiled more by such patronage is holding elections to see who 
is more popular (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi&Przeworski, 2007). 
Challenge also comes to the authoritarian regimes from the opposition groups in the 
society. When autocrats need to neutralize these threats and “solicit the cooperation of 
outsiders”, they usually use democratic institutions such as elections (Gandhi&Prezeworski, 
2007, p. 1279). Since they can set the rules for competition, decide inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness of the system (Lust-Okar, 2004), and influence electoral outcomes with direct and 
indirect ways (Schwedler, 1998); autocrats rely on democratic institutions to maintain their 
interests. It is a fact that “divide and rule” is a historically valid method in politics, and 
autocracies use it very often to maximize their room for maneuver (Brumberg, 2002). 
Moderating radical opposition could be another motive to hold elections in authoritarian 
regimes. It is possible to make opposition condemn violence, act openly and respect the 
government rules in order to participate in the elections. To survive in the pluralist system, 
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radicals will have to compromise from some ideological extremism and become more moderate. 
In return, they will be allowed to pursue their political agendas on low politic issues (Schwedler, 
1998; Brumberg, 2002; Gandhi&Przeworski, 2007). 
Clearly then, “political success” in semi-democratic settings have a different meaning 
than topping elections. I argue that it is the ability of the elected governments to govern the 
society without any interference. As Huntington (1968) contends “the most important political 
distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of 
government,” (p.1). Similarly, Francis Fukuyama notes that an essential feature of many 
developing countries is the gap between the formal claims of the state authority, and its actual 
capacity to govern (Fukuyama, 2004). This capacity has two aspects to it: first reining in the 
power of the existing authoritarian actor, which will lead to a shift in the balance of power, and 
then maintaining/consolidating the new balance of power, favoring one’s own political agenda. 
Thus, I argue that the real success of the AKP lies not in the Party’s landslide electoral 
victories, since they were not unprecedented, but in its ability to appease the Kemalist state 
structure, and shift the balance of political power in favor of itself. I believe that this is why the 
literature focusing solely on electoral success of the AKP fails to explain the demise of the 
Welfare Party after its sensational election victories. 
The second weakness of the literature is its attempt to analyze Turkish society in 
superficial dichotomies such as “center vs. periphery”, “state vs. society” or “Kemalists vs. 
Islamists.” In fact, revolving around a Weberian type of state definition, the literature fails to 
account for the various power centers in Turkish society that cut across class, religious, or 
ideological lines. In fact, none of these categories can be portrayed as a homogenous block 
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pursuing the same political agenda. Within and across the categories, there are multiple power 
centers, big and small, competing with each for the fulfillment of their political agendas. 
Joel Migdal addresses this patched characteristic of the society with a new definition of 
state in his state-in-society approach. He contends “the society is a web or mélange, rather than a 
pyramidal structure with the state’s rule-making mechanisms at the apex,” (2001, p.36). This 
web, according to Migdal, consists of “multiple rule-making loci, and the hidden and open 
conflict among these multiple centers seeking to exercise domination,” (Migdal, 2001, p.36). 
These power centers do not necessarily represent a single class, religion, or an ethnic group. 
Rather, they are comprised of individuals who share similar value sets and compete for the 
domination of their values. 
I believe that this depiction of the state is a much closer fit to the Turkish case. Due to its 
historical, ideological and political realities various power centers are all in a constant struggle 
with each other for domination of their sets of values and beliefs in Turkish society. Some of 
these power loci are the military, the Constitutional Court, the President, the Parliament, the 
Kurds, Alewits, Sunnis, and the Kemalists elites. Putting the state-in-society approach at the 
center of its analysis, this study aims to evaluate the determinants of the AKP’s success in 
appeasing the power of the Kemalist state structure, which was a threat to the rule of the Party, 
and shifting the balance of power in favor of itself – a virtue I contend is what differentiates the 
Party from its predecessors. 
The central question this study aims to answer is “How has the AKP managed to appease 
the Kemalist state structure and shift the balance of power in favor of itself, while its predecessor 
the Welfare Party did not?” I argue that the use of particularistic policy promises as a coalition-
building strategy can provide part of the answer. There is no doubt that a broad support base will 
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be useful for winning elections. But I believe the diversity of the coalition members will provide 
the Party with the necessary means for changing the balance of power at different levels in 
different arenas such as the media, the judiciary, the discourse of the political sphere etc. For 
example, a coalition partner that has a TV channel, a radio station or newspaper will enable the 
Party to confront the Kemalist state structure in the media as well. Or a partner with strong 
foreign connections will provide international support that can be vital and determinant in these 
countries. In short, the diversity of coalition members opens new fronts that can be used to either 
target the status quo seekers or defend oneself vis-à-vis them. 
4.1.PARTICULARISTIC POLITICS IN THE “STATE OF NATURE” 
Different historical and institutional circumstances may make different strategies 
politically more or less viable and socially more or less acceptable. Therefore, before examining 
how group-specific policy promises can be used as a coalition-building strategy for political 
survival and domination, I will provide a brief summary of Joel Migdal’s state-in-society 
approach as a fertile context for particularistic politics. 
“Many of the existing approaches to understanding social and political change in the 
Third World either have downplayed conflict altogether (e.g., much of “modernization” theory), 
or have missed these particular sorts of conflicts, which only on occasion are class based (e.g., 
much of the Marxist literature), or have skipped the important dynamics within domestic society 
altogether (e.g., dependency and world-system theories),” observes Joel Migdal (2001, p.65). 
This incompetency, according to Migdal, derives from a misunderstanding of Weber’s classical 
state definition (see Figure 1). Weber defines state as “a human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” (Migdal, 
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2001, p.13). Migdal argues that that this “omnipotent given” image of the state is one of its two 
components: 
1-An image, a perception of the state as “the chief and appropriate rule maker within its 
territorial boundaries”, which is “fairly autonomous, unified and centralized,” (Migdal, 2001, 
p.16).  
2- The actual practices of multiple parts of the state, which may bolster the image of the 
state, or batter it. 
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What other scholars overlook, he continues, is the second component; the actual practices 
of multiple parts of the state, which may bolster the image of the state, or batter it. Therefore, 
according to Migdal, in order to understand the political change one should look at the 
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Figure 1: Weberian State 
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pyramidal structure with the state’s rule-making mechanism at the apex,” (Migdal, 2001, p.16). 
In other words, moving away from a perspective that simply puts state against society, Migdal 
offers a state which is a player among multiple power centers in the society that are constantly at 
hidden and open conflict over social control (Migdal, 2001) (See Figure II). 
Moreover, he delineates the state as neither a unified nor a coherent actor in its struggle 
with societal forces as its image suggests. On the contrary, Migdal contends that the parts of the 
state are also at conflict with one another. They and do not refrain from building coalitions with 
other formal or informal organizations to develop practices contradicting the official laws and 
regulations of the state (Migdal, 2001). 
 
Figure 2: Migdal's State 
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He further notes that the struggles for domination take place in multiple arenas, and is not 
limited to the question of who controls the top leadership position of the state (Migdal, 2001). As 
aforementioned earlier, pseudo governments do not tell us much about the actual ruler of the 
society. Whose laws prevail? Who controls the society? We cannot answer these questions by 
just looking at the top leadership position of a country unless we know the “degree” of 
government, whether it is autonomous from any influence or whether it actually controls the 
society. Hence, we cannot limit the scope of the power struggle to a single arena. There are 
various arenas that can be used for confrontation or accommodation by multiple power loci such 
as the media, the judiciary, the legislature, the discourse of the society, and elections are but one 
of them. 
If this social struggle is not simply for controlling the top leadership position of the state, 
then what is it for? “Social control is the currency for which social organizations compete,” 
answers Migdal (Migdal, 2001, p.51) for the supremacy of a group’s rules or value system 
requires social control. In addition, it is necessary for the enhancement of the strength and 
autonomy of the ruler, and reflected by compliance, participation, and legitimacy (Migdal, 
2001). 
According to Migdal, there are two paths for sustaining social control. The first one is 
political mobilization of masses, which entails “conveying to people that the routines, symbols, 
and ways of behaving represented [by that power center] are essential to their well-being. And 
involves providing them with channels to express their support,” (Migdal, 2001, p. 71).  The 
second one is the strategies of survival, which becomes a necessity due to the lack of broad 
political support. While broad political mobilization solves the problem of social control by 
lessening the centrifugal forces, lack thereof “makes the position of state leaders precarious, 
 28 
especially in the face of any other significant concentration of power in the society, which 
ultimately might be used against them,” (Migdal, 2001, p.71).  Therefore, such narrower bases of 
popular support necessitate the application of survival strategies that aim to “weakening any 
group in society that seems to be building extensive mobilization strength, even the agencies of 
the state itself,” (Migdal, 2001, p.72). 
Migdal goes into detail explaining the strategies of survival while he pays little attention 
to strategies of social mobilization other than stating that it demands much more than 
exhortations, charisma, or ideology of state leaders. In addition, he suggests that it would be 
better “for state leaders to undermine those other organizations and the efficacy of their rules by 
supplying to people a mix of rewards, sanctions, and symbols” that constitutes a more attractive 
value set than the other organizations offer (Migdal, 2001, p.66). However, he does not expound 
the “rewards, sanctions, and symbols” that would convince people to trail behind. 
What conveys to people that the routines, symbols, and ways of behaving represented by 
that power center are essential to their wellbeing? How do these people come to believe that their 
fate/future lies in with that actor? At this point, I offer group-specific policy promises made by 
political parties or governments as one of the mobilization strategies that could have such an 
effect on people from different power centers. 
Joel Migdal mentions the importance of building coalitions and a domestic balance of 
power as a strategy of survival. However, in his argument, this coalition building is limited to 
“those agencies and organization whose services and products are of direct benefit to a regime 
that cannot bring them under central control,” –namely “state-owned enterprises, local capital, 
multinational firms, and other important state agencies (including the military),” (Migdal, 2001, 
p.82). 
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On the other hand, I believe that this coalition building strategy could be applied on the 
societal level. On the demand side, power centers yearn for a powerful ally that could help them 
fulfill their political agendas. On the supply side, political parties have the means necessary to 
channel the demands of its allies by taking advantage of the democratic openings the system 
offers – how small they might be. 
The Demand Side (The Society): As already discussed, society consists of multiple 
power centers, and each power center has its own value set, beliefs, and policy preferences. In 
addition, these power centers are at a constant conflict with one another for the fulfillment of 
their interests and political agendas. In this “state of nature”, obviously some actors are powerful 
while others are not, some are more influential while others are peripheral, and some benefit 
from the reproduction of the existing balance of power while others and seek an opportunity to 
change the status quo. Democratic institutions in a fully democratic political setting, especially 
elections, may present such an opportunity. Whereas, in countries where election victories do not 
necessarily change the existing balance of power, these democratic institutions lose their 
efficiency as the channels of voice for the unsatisfied actors in the system. Authoritarian actors in 
semi-democratic states do not refrain from interfering, interrupting, and even suspending 
democratic processes, which might be upsetting the existing balance of power reproducing the 
authoritarian domination. Therefore, the challengers need to acquire, aggrandize, and maintain 
political power to challenge this rule and set a new balance of power favoring their utility 
functions – be it a political agenda, belief system or an economic interest. 
However, not every one of these challengers has the strength, opportunity or capability to 
control and dominate the society on its own. They need to increase their influence by aligning 
with more powerful groups that are willing to incorporate their partners’ political agendas into 
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their utility functions. In other words, in a rational choice exchange model, power centers 
exchange their resources and get into a coalition for political influence in an effort to maximize 
their utility. In return, they provide compliance, participation and legitimacy to their partners 
through different channels. 
The Supply Side (The Political Party): Being one of the power centers in the society, a 
political party also represents a certain way of thinking, ideology, and utility function. And just 
like any other power center that is not happy with the status quo, some of them want to change 
the existing balance of power. Their advantage is that these parties have an actual potential to 
change the status quo and have social control over society, if they could sustain political 
mobilization of the masses or apply strategies of survival, according to Migdal. 
Since it is a semi-democratic political setting, there are channels that are open to every 
power center in the society.  Even though authoritarian actors abuse them from time to time, they 
exist. Elections, media, NGOs, referendums, demonstrations of support or opposition, strikes, 
universities, economic forums, the courts, the Parliament etc, all can be used -to a lesser or a 
greater degree- as channels for expressing political support, compliance, legitimacy or there lack 
of. 
However, in order to take advantage of all this support channeled through various 
platforms, the party needs to appeal to people from different power centers on different grounds. 
Moreover, the party should respond to the demands and longings of a particular power center to 
an extent that the people in that power center would believe that the routines, symbols, and ways 
of behaving represented by the party are essential to their own well-being. The strength of the 
bond between a power center and the party will depend on the sense of urgency among members 
of this symbiotic relationship about the dangers of upsetting the coalition. I argue that in a 
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society, in which there are multiple power centers with their own utility functions, one of the 
strategies for creating this kind of attachment is through particularistic politics. 
First of all, it gives the political party the flexibility to determine the partners of this 
relationship via including or excluding any power center of its choice according to the value of 
the resources or the degree of support provided by that power center. Such flexibility gives a 
dynamic characteristic to the coalition, meaning that the party or a coalition member may prefer 
to defect at any time during the process of challenging the status quo for any reason. Likewise, 
the party may create new symbiotic relations with new power centers on the course of the 
struggle. In sum, particularistic politics provides the party with the necessary means to regulate 
the size and the composite of the coalition. 
What is the ideal size for such coalitions?  Riker (1962) argues that where coalitions are 
engaged in a zero-sum competition with other coalitions over a limited source, and where 
coalition leaders can offer side payments (bribes, money, promises or other things of value) to 
induce outsiders to join them, rational coalition leaders will aim to attract only the smallest 
number of members into their coalition that they need in order to win the competition –size 
principle (p.33). In short, where additional members tend to raise the costs without adding 
benefits to the coalition, the coalition leader will be inclined to create a minimum winning 
coalition, the smallest possible coalition that will be enough for winning the majority of votes 
(Riker, 1962; Koehler, 1972; Shepsle, 1974; Uslaner, 1975; Koford, 1982; Denzau and Munger, 
1986; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989). 
As rational as it may sound in theory, political scientist have found that Riker’s minimum 
winning coalition does not hold empirically, and oversized coalitions are more common in 
politics (Ferejohn, 1974; Arnold, 1979; Wilson, 1986; Collie, 1988, Carubba & Volden, 2000). 
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Why? First of all, the size principle depends on the particular aim or goal of the coalition. If it is 
not a zero-sum game, meaning that the spoils of the victory do not have to be divided amongst 
the coalition members, then there is no need to strict the size of the members. Second, even Riker 
himself accepts that there is an uncertainty problem with regards to the probability of winning 
the battle: “Since the members of the coalition may not be certain about whether or not it is 
winning, they may in their uncertainty create a coalition larger than the actual minimum winning 
size (Riker, 1962, p.48). Likewise, when there is an uncertainty about the reliability of the 
coalition partners, or when the incentive to defect is high, oversized coalitions will be more 
probable (Carubba & Volden, 2000). Moreover, when the status quo policy is ideologically 
extreme, and the coalition builder wants to change it, an oversized coalition will arise (Baron & 
Diermeir, 2001). Last but not least, oversized coalitions may develop if partners are not only 
concerned about holding government office, but also influencing policy (Strom, 1990). Another 
argument is that oversized coalitions arise when there is a need to reduce the conflict of interest 
among different parties via including more centrist groups to the coalition (Axelrod, 1970). 
Considering that 1- our context does not provide a robust institutional environment where 
the rules of the game are clear, agreed and established, and framed in terms of game theory, 2- 
the spoil of the victory – which is changing the existing balance of power in our case- is a 
collective good benefiting all members of the coalition, and 3- the coalition builder can never be 
sure about the minimum power that is going to be necessary for shifting the balance of power as 
it is a process rather than a single election victory; I argue that oversized coalitions will give a 
better chance of success for the political parties in our cases. As a mobilization strategy, coalition 
building via group specific politics will aim to attain as much support as it can via oversized 
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coalitions that will be of great help for the survival of the coalition builder vis-à-vis the 
threatening power centers. 
Second, group-specific policy promises as a coalition-building strategy enables the party 
to build a broad coalition without an effort to sustain harmony among its members as each power 
center in the coalition will be connected directly to the party and not necessarily to each other. 
The relationship between the party and a coalition member will be a vertical one in the sense that 
the party will provide the policy preferences of the coalition member in exchange for its support, 
and other coalition members will have nothing to do with this bargain as their preference sets are 
different. Hence, I believe that the structure of the coalition created by group-specific policy 
promises will be more like Figure 3 than Figure 4. 
The patron-client type of relationship between the party and the power center shown in 
Figure 3 resembles what political scientist call as “contemporary clientelism.” 
Piattoni (2001) describes contemporary clientelism in a nutshell as a “strategy for the 
acquisition, maintenance, and aggrandizement of political power, on the part of the patrons, and 
strategies for the protection and promotion of their interest, on the part of the clients, and that 
their deployment is driven by given sets of incentives and disincentives,” (p.2).  In this vein then, 
contemporary clientelism can be increasingly used as “a means to pursue the delivery of 
collective as opposed to individual goods,” which means that “political clienteles are less likely 
to assume the form of loose clusters of independently negotiated dyads than organizations, 
communities or even whole regions that fashion relationships or reach understanding with 
politicians, public officials and administrations,” (Gay, 1998, p.14). 
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I believe that the relationship created by the group-specific policies of the party 
resembles “contemporary clientelism”, because these scholars interpret clientelism strictly as 
exchange relations – a non-universalistic quid pro quo relation- ruled by cost-benefit analysis of 
both patrons and clients. In other words, “what matters [in clientelistic relations] to both patron 
and client is the advantage that can be drawn from the exchange,” (Piattoni, 2011, p.13). Such an 
economic approach enables the political party to choose the level of aggrandizement depending 
on its interest (Piattoni, 2001) Modern clientelism, then, offers more than merely an exchange of 
votes for favors. It offers “the exchange of votes for what political actors would like to present as 
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favors but the least privileged elements of the population demand or claim as rights,” (Gay, 
1998, p.15). 
Based on this definition, our coalition then can be described as an abstract collection of 
bilateral symbiotic relations between different power centers in the society and the political 
party. Considering the symbiotic, bilateral character of this relationship, we can contend that the 
party will focus on strengthening its bilateral ties with each member of the coalition rather than 
trying to sustain the coherence of the coalition itself - which brings us back to the first benefit of 
the particularistic politics: the flexibility of regulating the size and the composite of the coalition. 
To sum up, the supply side of this symbiotic, bilateral relation (political party) offers 
group-specific policies as coalition building strategy for acquisition, maintenance, and 
aggrandizement of political power that is necessary to rein in the power of the authoritarian 
actor, and shift the balance of power in favor of itself. On the other hand, the demand side 
(power centers in the society) prefers to get into this kind of relationship for the protection and 
promotion of their interests. More importantly, both sides are aware that they need to struggle 
with the existing authoritarian power in different arenas. 
After the establishment of the coalition, the partners begin to develop a common 
language and change the discourse of the struggle through every possible channel. Through this 
discursive change and their reactions to different issues in different arenas, the coalition shapes 
the discourse of what is acceptable and what is not in the political sphere. Apparently, as the 
coalition or collection of power centers gets broader, the discursive change they offer gets more 
widespread across different conflict areas. Moreover, a broader coalition means a broader 
support base that is ready to mobilize. As the balance of power mandates, the broader the 
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coalition gets, the higher the chance of survival for the political party will be vis-à-vis 
threatening power centers. 
If this is true, I expect to find that in semi-democratic political settings with strong 
authoritarian actors, political parties that build broad coalitions consisting of various power 
centers in the society via group-specific policy promises will be more likely to shift the balance 
of power in favor of themselves than actors that lack such connections. Consequently, I contend 
that the AKP is the first Islamist political party in Turkey that pursued this strategy, and it was 
these group-specific policy promises that eventually helped the Party to repel the Kemalist state 
structure back, and shift the balance of power in favor of itself. 
Hypothesis: In semi democratic Turkish political setting, political parties that build 
broad coalitions consisting of various power centers in the society via group specific policy 
promises will be more likely to shift the balance of power in favor of themselves than actors that 
lack such connections 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
I will evaluate my hypothesis by comparing the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
and the Welfare Party in a most similar systems research design. I aim to assess the correlation, 
if any, that have linked my independent variable “group-specific policy promises” and my 
dependent variable “a shift in the balance of power” for each case. 
Such an approach makes it possible to vary the coalition building strategies of both parties 
while controlling for potentially intervening factors effectively. While these intervening factors 
might be originating from intrinsic characteristics such as their identity, ideology, or 
electoral success, they might also be related to the contextual factors such as the state of the 
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economy, party system, electoral environment, and legal framework (especially Law on Political 
Parties and the Deputy Electoral Law). 
Nevertheless, considering the fact that the AKP is the heir of the Welfare Party might help 
us control all these intervening factors. First of all, they share similar ideologies, namely 
Islamism or conservatism. Second, they both had sensational electoral victories – the Welfare 
Party in 1994 (local), and 1995 elections, and the AKP in 2002, 2004 (local), 2007, 2009 (local), 
and 2011 elections. Third, they were both subjects of the same party system, legal code, and 
electoral environment. Moreover, both parties competed in a neoliberal economic setting. Last 
but not least, 1994 economic crisis for the Welfare Party, and 2001 economic crisis for the AKP 
set the stage for the failures of the alternative parties on the ideological continuum. 
I take the military intervention as a cut point in my examination of the parties and their 
survival strategies vis-à-vis the demands of the military. These military interventions are 
embodied not as full-fledged military coup d’état’s but as memorandum to the same effect.   By 
looking at the first two terms of the AKP government (2002-2007), I expect to assess the 
relationship between the survival strategy that carried the party to the power and its triumph over 
the military. Such limitation in the scope of the study is considered to be appropriate as its 
repulsion of the military in 2007 proved to be a turning point for the political agenda and the 
survival strategies of the party. 
I turn to the clarification of what I mean by the Kemalist/nationalist or the authoritarian 
state structure before starting my analysis.  
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4.1. KEMALIST/NATIONALIST STATE STRUCTURE 
4.1.1. THE MILITARY  
In the 19th century, Ottoman Empire was far from its glorious days. The defeats against 
Western powers followed one another, and Ottoman military was first to blame. Sultan II. 
Mahmut realized that it was the backwardness of the traditional Janissaries vis-à-vis the modern 
armies of the Europe that lead to the humiliating defeats and empty treasure.  Therefore, in order 
to be able to compete with the latest technology of the Western powers, the Empire has 
dismissed the Janissary army and established a Western-style military school, Mekteb-i Harbiye. 
However, students of Mekteb-i  Harbiye were not getting education only on the latest war 
techniques but also were espoused to Western ideas and ideologies at school. As a result, these 
military officials played a significant role in the modernization of the Ottoman Empire. When 
they realized that the fall of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable, these officers did not hesitate to 
start an independence war against foreign occupation and the Istanbul government. Young 
military officials educated in modern sciences were the founders of the Turkish Republic. 
After Turkey was founded in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk –the leader of the 
Independence War- prohibited the political activities of officers on active duty with the Military 
Penal Code numbered 1632 and dated 22 May 1930. However, The Turkish military has always 
perceived itself as the guardian of the state. Kemalist ideology, the modernization of Turkey 
especially via secularism, became the end and the means that the military devoted its existence 
to. 
Then it is no surprise that the Turkish military never refrained from intervening politics, 
especially when they perceived an Islamist threat to the Kemalist ideals. The military bases its 
interferences on the Inner Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces, which was established after 
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the 1960 coup by the National Unity Committee. In subsequent coup d'états and coup d'état 
attempts, especially the Article 3512 of this act is used to justify the political activities of the 
military. 
Turkish military had a record of intervening in politics, removing elected governments 
from power in every ten years. There were a coup d'état in 1960 (27 May Coup) –resulted in the 
execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, in 1971 (12 March Coup), and in 1980 (12 
September Coup). It also maneuvered the removal of an Islamic-oriented government party –the 
Welfare Party- with a post-modern coup in 1997 (28 February Process), and attempted to remove 
another –the AKP- in 2007 (27 April) with an online memorandum. 
4.1.2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT  
After the 27 May Coup in 1960, an informal coalition of the military, Kemalist elites and 
Republican People’s Party wanted to strengthen the institutional checks and balances vis-a-vis 
the government. Their aim was to constrain democratically elected governments and prevent any 
possible abuse of power. The Constitutional Court was established in 1962 as one such 
institution. Prior to that date, absolute superiority of the Parliament was adopted as a 
constitutional principle. However, such absolute superiority proved to be a dangerous weapon 
used for counter-revolution in the wrong hands. The election victories and the support enjoyed 
by the perpetrators were irrelevant. Kemalist state structure believed that the only modernization 
path for Turkey was the top-down approach, and therefore constituency and their representatives 
should be set to correct path when needed. Contrary to the Article 3 of the 1924 Constitution 
emphasizing that “sovereignty belongs to the nation without any restrictions or provisions” 
(Earle, 1925), Kemalist elites believed that it should be filtered through bureaucratic agencies 
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loyal to the Kemalist ideals. The military junta cemented these ideals and its power by 1961 
Constitution. Although the following coup in 1982 replaced the 1962 Constitution with a more 
statist one, the Constitutional Court remained intact. 
The Court has participated in many party closure cases ever since, contending that these 
parties were acting against Kemalist ideals and the principle of national integrity. While Party 
(DEP) and Democratic Society Party (HADEP) were banned due to their violation of the 
principle of territorial and national integrity, Islamist Parties such as The Welfare Party and the 
Virtue Party were banned due to their reactionary activities towards secularism. 
In addition to party closures, the Constitutional Court also ruled that wearing headscarves 
in universities was unconstitutional. 
The Constitutional Court made an attempt to ban the AKP in 2008 because it became a 
“focal point” for reactionary activities. The attempt was not successful. 
4.1.3. THE PRESIDENT 
The Turkish President is the head of state. Even though, the Presidency is largely a 
ceremonial office, it has some important functions that exceed the duties of a normal presidency 
office in a parliamentary system. He represents the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the 
Turkish nation; oversees the implementation of the Turkish Constitution, and ensures the 
harmonious functioning of the organs of state. 
There are two legislative functions that particularly give strength to the President over the 
Parliament. The first one is the President’s right to return the laws to the Parliament to be 
reconsidered. And the second is to appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of certain 
provisions or the entirety of laws, decrees, or rules of procedure on the grounds that they are 
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unconstitutional in form or in content. Such powers could and did block the functioning of the 
Parliament when there is an ideological gap between the President and the government. 
4.1.4. THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY (CHP) AND KEMALIST INTELLECTUALS  
The CHP has played a significant role in the establishment of Turkey, and, therefore, 
perceives itself as the founding father and the guardian of the Republic.  Having acting as the 
umbrella organization for resistance groups during the Independence War, People’s Party entered 
into politics and declared itself as a political organization on September 9, 1923 after the defeat 
of the occupying forces. On October 29, 1923, Ataturk renamed People's Party as "Republican 
People's Party" (CHP) and initiated the 20-year-long single party domination of CHP in Turkish 
politics. From the very early stages, CHP’s party programs and policies have been deeply rooted 
in the Kemalist ideals, namely republicanism, nationalism, statism, populism, secularism 
(laicite), and revolutionism. 
During the single-party period, the CHP worked as an instrument for the top-down 
modernization and Westernization of Turkish society. However, this top-down process combined 
with the strict secularization of the Islamic sphere lead to a great discontent among masses. 
These masses used every bit of democratic opening to try to oust the CHP out of power, showing 
the leaders of the CHP how fragile their rule was13. It was this discontent that obstructed any 
CHP led government ever since Turkey’s transition to multiparty democracy. 
During the interim "multi-party periods" between the military coups of 1960, 1971, and 
1980, CHP was regarded as a social-democrat party14 with a strong nationalist and secular 
emphasis. 
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However, the Party failed to offer a solution to the working class and lower classes 
suffering from the adverse effects of neoliberalism during 1980s. Such failure widened the gap 
between the lower classes and the Party, and, as a result, moved the Party further away from its 
“leftist” stance. The party ideology was now solely depended on the Kemalist ideals and 
nationalism. 
The Republican People's Party is currently at the center-left of the ideological continuum 
with traditional ties to the middle and upper-middle classes, consisting of white-collar workers, 
retired generals, government bureaucrats, academics, college students, left-leaning intellectuals 
(secular intellectuals in Turkish context) and some labor unions such as DİSK. 
4.2.COALITION BUILDING PHASE 
To all my other selves in other parallel universes: Hope you are having as much fun. If 
you are not, close your eyes and find comfort in the thought that one of us is having a hell of a 
good life. Since the parties will not be able to actually govern the country and implement their 
own political agenda until they shift the balance of power in favor of themselves, the party 
programs, urgent action plans, election speeches, legal arrangements as well as the statements of 
party leaders might not explicitly reveal the coalition building strategies of the AKP and the 
Welfare Party. As the balance of power slowly shifts towards the Party, the discourse and the 
actions of the party will be expressed more explicitly, and the party will take bolder steps. This 
shift will take some time, and, therefore, needs to be analyzed as a process. I will use content 
analysis on various documents, such as election speeches, laws, executive orders, constitutional 
amendments, commission reports, and comments/statement of party leaders, to evaluate both my 
independent and the dependent variables. 
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In short, asking the questions of "who says what, to whom, why, to what extent and with 
what effect?" will enable us to analyze the coalition building strategy of the party on the one 
hand, and how this coalition is used by the party to shift the balance of power in the political 
sphere on the other hand. Thereby, we will first try to understand the coalition building strategies 
of the parties – group-specific policy promises in the AKP case, and there lack of in the Welfare 
Party case. Second, via studying the discourse of different power centers in various arenas, we 
will reveal the level of compliance, support, and legitimacy these power centers provide for the 
party. And third, we will try to find a correlation –if any- between the support of the coalition 
members and the party’s success in shifting the balance of power in favor of itself, or there lack 
of. 
4.2.1. IV: GROUP SPECIFIC POLICY PROMISES AS A COALITION BUILDING 
STRATEGY 
Studying all these documents will give away a pattern or a mindset that is unique to each 
party. I believe that this pattern can be used to study the coalition building strategies of the AKP 
and the Welfare Party. While tracing for correlations, the texts mentioned above will be 
evaluated with reference to a set of questions for each case: 
• Is the party targeting a particular group or is it taking into account large segments of the 
society?? Who benefits from the new regulation? 
• Do the party leaders mention or imply any particular group with regards to the new 
regulation while giving statements or making comments? 
•  Is there a pattern in the statements or actions of the parties towards a particular group or 
a subject? For example, are they only interested in the Kurdish problem as opposed to the 
general improvement of minority rights? 
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•  Do parties ever imply that they are fulfilling their promises to a particular group? 
4.2.2. DV: SHIFTING THE BALANCE OF POWER 
These documents/statements are also important in terms of their role in initiating a 
discussion across the country, in which the reaction of different power centers will shed light on 
the ongoing power struggle within the society. Studying the reactions is important because they 
showcase who is aligning with the party, who is opposing it, and on what grounds – what we 
mean by the power struggle. 
• Who are supporting the party? Who are opposing it? With what means? 
• Are the groups consistent with their support/opposition across the issues to an extent that 
we can call them “coalition partners” or “clashing powers?” 
• Is this discursive change –created both by the action of the government and the reactions 
of other power centers to it- help changing the balance of power at all? Who withdraws 
after all the dust settles down? 
• Do power centers ever mention promises made by the party to them? 
5. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: COALITIONS WITH THE POWER CENTERS IN 
TURKISH SOCIETY 
5.1. KURDS 
In 1923, with the aim of establishing a secular Westernized nation state, Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk began to implement his top-down modernization policy. He desired to create a new 
regime based on concepts of cultural unity, rationalism, secularism and a liberal economy. In this 
respect, all former Ottoman subjects living in Anatolia were accepted as members of the new 
Turkish nation. As Mustafa Kemal’s cultural policy was based on the assimilation and/or 
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elimination of ethnic elements other than Turks, ethnic groups demanding to maintain their local 
cultural traditions were threats to territorial integrity and political unity of state. As a result, the 
policy of cultural unity pursued by the Kemalists gave rise to the emergence of recurring Kurdish 
uprisings against the central government since 1925. State authorities created the perception that 
military measures were the only solution to the problem since they described the uprisings as 
ethnic separatist movements regardless of their genuine origin or intent. 
Especially after the 1980 military coup, hard-core Turkish nationalism towards Kurds 
fueled counter nationalism among Kurds and increased the number of Kurdish 
separatist/rebellious movements. Accordingly, 1990’s witnessed more military operations, more 
casualties, and more aggression on both sides. On the one hand, the state ideology dictated that 
Turkey did not have a “Kurdish problem” because there was no such thing as “Kurd.” These 
people who called themselves Kurd were simply “mountain Turks.” There was a “terror 
problem” and it could only be solved via military measures. On the other hand, Kurdish 
resistance to assimilation took a dual course; 
1-A peaceful political struggle to obtain basic civil rights for Kurds in Turkey, 
2- A violent armed struggle to obtain a separate Kurdish state. 
The dimensions of the resistance to the state ideology along with the size of the Kurdish 
population15 generated the perception that Kurds belonged to the only minority group that posed 
a threat to Turkish national unity. Therefore, Kurds and the Kurdish issue had been on the 
agenda of each and every government in Turkish politics – including interval (military) 
governments, especially when the armed struggle got increasingly violent on both sides. 
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  18% according to the CIA World Factbook and 7.07 % according to the Turkish Statistical Institute	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More than 70 reports have been published on the issue between 1920 and 2010, 
intensifying in two periods: 1- One Party Period (CHP) and 2- After 1990s. The reports during 
the one party period were simply a repetition of the official state ideology and defined the 
problem as a “public order” issue. This character has changed after 1990s. As products of 
objective research done by NGOs and political parties, the reports written after 1990 referred to 
the problem as an identity and democracy problem that worsens with the democracy and human 
rights violations of the Turkish state (Yayman, 2011). After all, it was clear that it would take 
more than military measures to solve the problem of Kurdish people living in a region that was 
under the state of emergency for 51 years, from 1925 to 1950 and from 1978 to 2002. 
Even though the identity problem was recognized by most of the political parties, the 
governments were not able to step back from the official state ideology with regards to the 
Kurdish problem for a very long time. 
5.1.1. THE WELFARE’S RELATION WITH KURDS: 
Islamist movements and the Kurdish movement in Turkey have always been sympathetic 
to the sufferings of each other as they were both marginalized by the same Kemalist state 
ideology. Additionally, Islam played a significant role in bringing these two groups together 
considering the fact that most of the Kurdish population in the east and southeast Turkey 
were practicing Sunni Muslims. It was not until 1991 that the Welfare Party prepared a report on 
the Kurdish problem that had both the origin of the problem and policy recommendations for the 
Party leadership. Rather than being a genuine effort of the Party to end the sufferings of the 
Kurds, the report was more of a guideline on “how to win Kurdish voters,” a constituency base 
that was alienated by the alliance of the Welfare Party and ultranationalist Nationalist Movement 
Party in 1991 elections. 
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The Welfare report was prepared by the order of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then a young 
and respected member of the Welfare Party who would become the popular leader of the AKP in 
the upcoming years. Erdogan was against the election coalition with an ultra-nationalist party 
due to the fear that it would alienate the traditional Islamist Kurdish voter base in the 
Southeast16. Yet, with the approval of the Party leader Necmettin Erbakan , the coalition formed 
and won 16.90% of votes in the 1991 election that opened the doors of the National Assembly to 
the Welfare Party with 40 MPs17. 
The report was written with the aim of regaining traditional Islamic Kurdish votes after 
the 1991 election, and consisted of two parts 1-The Problem and 2- Proposals. The proposals 
were quite radical at that time as they “[were] still sharply inconsistent with traditional opinions 
among military elites and state bureaucrats, and for the first time accepted the existence of a 
Kurdish question,” (Efegil, 2011, p.30). 
According to the report, Turkey [had] a “Kurdish” question, and Southeastern Anatolia 
was historically called Kurdistan. Their language [was] different from Turkish. Kurdish people 
suffer[ed] equally from military operations and the PKK terrorist attacks. Contrary to the 
common perception, except for some marginal Kurdish groups, most Kurdish people did not 
demand independence from Turkey. They only demanded freely practicing their cultural 
traditions and using their mother tongue. In sum, the acceptance of their identity and culture by 
the state authorities was much more important than independence for Kurds. 
The report indicated the following concrete suggestions for the party leadership: “the end 
of punitive measures upon local people, ensuring regional and economic development, the usage 
of the word “Kurd” more often, the improvement of human rights, development of the Kurdish 
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  http://dunyabulteni.net/index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=30433 
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culture, the establishment of a Kurdish institute, the free publication of Kurdish newspapers and 
journals, the formation of local parliaments, decreasing the central government’s powers and 
allowing the free use of the mother tongue.18”  
The report stressed the need to find a solution within the framework of full democratic, 
cultural pluralism and noted the reasons for the problem were denial, assimilation, and the 
suppressive policies of the central government. Consequently, “it supported the establishment of 
a new legal state, which would be prescriptive to equal political, social and cultural rights for all 
people,” (Efegil, 2011). The Welfare Party’s suggestion for such new legal state was the Just 
Order. By replacing the Kemalist ideology with brotherhood of Muslims, Just Order would erase 
any ethnic or racial tensions.  
Thus, even though Erbakan took the report seriously and established a Southeastern 
Study Group, it seems that he did not fully grasp the essence of it. According to Erbakan, both 
Turkish and Kurdish nationalism were at fault, and the only solution was Islam.  In a parliament 
speech, he underlined this fact by stating, “Above anything, we are Muslims. We are brothers 
and sisters19.” Erbakan did not recognize the just and equal togetherness of the Turkish and 
Kurdish nationalities as different ethnic groups, but rather replacing the century-old “nation” 
with “umma” via underrating the ethnicity factor. According to Erbakan, “When the system is 
just, would it make any difference whether someone is a Kurd or a Turk? Or when the system 
obeys the Zionists and exploits its people, does it make any difference for the exploited whether 
he is a Turk or a Kurd20?” 
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However, by focusing on the common religion factor that referred to the Sunni 
interpretation of Islam, the Welfare Party divided the Kurdish population and alienated the group 
with other sectarian beliefs. 
Nevertheless, the report shaped the discourse of the Welfare Party for long enough to 
rekindle Kurdish support for the Party. The 4th Congress of the Welfare Party, held on October 
10th, 1993, was particularly important in underlying the Party’s position regarding the Kurdish 
question. It was announced one again that the armed conflict in the East and Southeast was a 
conflict between the Kurdish and Turkish nationalism; which were both at fault because they 
were prioritizing ethnicity instead of brotherhood of all Muslims (Gulalp, 2003). Just Order 
based on Islamic principles was an alternative to the oppressive Kemalist ideology. It could solve 
the problems created by state’s assimilative strategies towards the Kurdish question. Remaining 
loyal to the proposals of the 1991 report, the Party once again stated that the state should 
recognize the Kurdish identity and give full cultural rights to Kurds -including the rights related 
to the use of Kurdish language- (Gulalp, 2003). The Kurdish problem did not remain the same 
during 1991-1995. “This period had witnessed the rise of “the military solution” that manifested 
itself in closing down two Kurdish nationalist parties, the HEP, and the DEP and in 
imprisonment of their deputies. The election booklet did not make any references to 
these important developments in Turkish political life,” (Duran, 1998). 
In Kurdish city Bingol in 1994, Erbakan gave his much contentious statements regarding 
the issue and the Kemalist state: “For centuries, children of this country started their education at 
school with the name of Allah every day. You abolished this tradition and replaced it with what? 
With ‘I am a Turk, honest and hardworking.’ If you say that, a Muslim brother from a Kurdish 
origin will have the right to say ‘Oh, is that so? Then, I am a Kurd, more honest, and more 
 51 
hardworking.’ By doing so, you estranged the children of this country to each other. Tomorrow, 
that parliament will be at the hands of the believers, and all those rights will be granted without 
spilling blood21.” Later in 10 March 2000, Erbakan was found guilty of “provoking the nation for 
hate and enmity via emphasizing the ethnic and religious differences – the famous Article 312 of 
the Turkish Criminal Law (TCK),” and sentenced one-year prison by the Diyarbakir State 
Security Court 22 . Even though, Erbakan repeatedly announced any “ethnicity” would be 
irrelevant in the new system (Just Order) and the most important thing would be the common 
religious beliefs of people. 
Mentioning “Kurds” as a separate ethnic group and demanding cultural rights for them 
helped Party win over the Kurdish voters in Kurdish cities and the big cities with large Kurdish 
immigrant population. In 1994 and 1995 elections, this win over translated 
into remarkable increase of Kurdish based votes for the Party (Calmuk, 2005). 
When the Welfare entered the parliament as the big coalition partner, its attitude and 
actions towards the Kurdish question were a total disappointment for not only Kurds but also for 
liberal elites.  “Taking into consideration the inflexibility of the Turkish political system, the 
strength of Turkish nationalism and unwillingness of its coalition partner the True Path Party 
(Dogru Yol Partisi), as well as the military to change the status-quo related to the Kurdish 
identity and cultural rights, the WP rearranged its priorities on the issue. Not unexpectedly, it 
shifted its emphasis to the economic side of the problem while identity and cultural rights 
dimension had to wait for some time,” (Duran, 1998). “Furthermore, the WP's reluctance in 
giving priority to democratization of the political system in power and its insistence on keeping 
anti-regime political symbols resulted in a regime crisis. This crisis inherently narrowed the 
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political space in which the WP would introduce some political reforms for the recognition of 
Kurdish identity and language,” (Duran, 1998). 
First of all, only a month after coming to power as the big coalition partner, Erbakan 
‘visited’ the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey, and ‘asked’ the opinions of the soldiers on 
OHAL (state of emergency in the eastern and southeastern Turkey) and reactionary movements. 
After a few weeks later, the Welfare-DYP coalition extended the OHAL, which had been 
considered responsible for the systematic human rights violations and the oppression of Kurds. 
Second, during an interview in his Libya visit (Oct. 5th, 1996) –as a reply to the 
accusations of Muammar Kaddafi on the sufferings of Kurds in Turkey- Erbakan argued “Turkey 
[was] a democracy. Turkish legal system [did] not discriminate against any race or ethnicity; 
each and every citizen [had] equal rights. Thus, Turkey [did] not have either a race or a gender 
problem. The only problem of Turkey [was] the problem of terrorism [referring to the Kurdish 
separatist movements-namely PKK], and this problem [was] rooted outside the Turkish borders. 
The West was trying to tear apart the territorial integrity of Turkey, using Kurds via provoking 
them towards this end. Turkey [did] not have a Kurdish problem. Turkey [had] a terrorism 
problem23.” Despite this word-by-word recitation of the state ideology, opposition parties and the 
media accused Erbakan of remaining passive against the humiliations from a ‘desert bedouin.’ 
On 16th of October, there was an interpellation against the Welfare-led government 
concerning its foreign visit choices. During the interpellation, State Minister Abdullah Gul 
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claimed that the interpellation was based on false accusations of the media, which obviously was 
determined to defame the Welfare Party24. 
Third, as full-fledged military operations against the PKK camps continued during the 
rule of the Welfare Party, nothing was done regarding the constitutional recognition of the 
Kurdish identity or the improvement of Kurdish culture and language. Instead, Erbakan offered 
“ummah” as an abstract alternative to the “nation,” and Islam as an alternative to “nationalism.” 
Even though, the Party established a Southeast Study Group, the focus of the group was mostly 
economic problems of the region. 
Consequently, contrary to its early discourse and the warnings of the Kurdish reports, the 
Welfare Party could hardly step outside of the official state ideology regarding the Kurdish 
problem. In addition to the political and social pressure –or because of it- Erbakan could not 
fully grasp the ethnic dimension of the problem. He did not fall short of using “Armenians with 
Kurdish origin25” as an insult that shows his confusion about the issue. 
Considering the ebbs and flows in the relations between the Welfare Party and Kurds, their 
limited coalition –if any- broke down at a very early stage, soon after the election victory of the 
Welfare Party in 1995. 
5.1.2. THE AKP’S RELATION WITH KURDS: 
The AKP-Kurdish relations dates back to the 1991 Kurdish report of the Welfare Party as 
the person who came up with that report was no other than Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself, the 
leader and the founder of the AKP. Aware of the origins of the problem and possible solutions to 
it, Erdogan and the AKP leadership based their Kurdish policy on two pillars. First, the full 
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  For an example of the fabricated news, see http://fotogaleri.haber7.com/inner/261120120301020408601.jpg 
which reads “The Storm of Lies” referring to the Prime Minister’s state of the nation address broadcasted the 
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recognition of the Kurdish identity as a different ethnic group, granting full cultural and social 
rights to Kurds, and narrowing the economic gap between the undeveloped East and 
industrialized West of the country. Second, armed struggle with the PKK that will go parallel to 
the improvement of Kurdish rights. In other words, the Party made a distinction between the 
separatist PKK terrorists and innocent civilians, and guaranteed carrot to the Kurds as long as 
they stay loyal to the state and do not get involved in terrorist acts.   
 Accordingly, starting from the establishment of the Party, the AKP used various channels 
to explain their group-specific strategy to Kurds, to change the discourse of the Turkish public, 
and to fulfill its promises.  
Early Period Policy Promises: 
Right after its establishment in 2001, the AKP devoted a special section of its Party 
Program to the Kurdish problem with the title of ‘The East and The Southeast26.” As a sign of 
particularistic politics, this section dealt with the specific policies that are to be pursued when the 
Party came to power. This particular section was an addition to the other sections Party such as 
‘Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,’ ‘Law and Justice,’ and ‘Democratization and Civil Society’ 
that underlie the democratic stance of the Party. 
First of all, the Program states that “The event, which some of us call the Southeastern, 
others call the Kurdish or the Terror problem, is, unfortunately, a reality in Turkey. In 
cognizance of the negative issues caused by this problem in our social life, [the AKP] shall 
follow a policy guarding the happiness, welfare, rights and freedoms of the regional 
population27.” It is remarkable that the Party uses all terms, including the ones utilized by the 
Kemalist state structure, which are related to the problem at the very beginning. By doing so, it 
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chooses a more moderate discourse that could be felt less of a threat to the Kemalist state 
structure. 
Second, after noting, “The cultural diversity in this region is considered richness by [the 
Party],” the Program suggests that the problem must be dealt in a manner which goes beyond the 
identification of the reality but respectful to the sensitivities of the entire society including the 
integrity of national borders28. 
Most importantly, the Program makes a distinction between terrorists and innocent 
civilians, and argues that the posture towards each of them should be different: “Our Party aims 
at putting an end to certain practices that are resorted to as a reaction to terror but go beyond 
their original purpose and disturb the region's population. It also aims at abolishing entirely the 
State of Emergency practices, which have been maintained for many years. We believe that our 
state must display a deterrent posture towards criminals and a protective posture towards 
innocents and must treat innocent people with affection.” In sum, the Party Program promises to 
put an end to the injustice and human rights violations in the region done by the Kemalist state 
structure in the name of war on terror. Contrary to earlier practices, the Party argues “terror and 
[state] oppression respectively feed one another.” Accordingly, any approach that ignores terror 
is a consequence of the oppression promotes more terror. The Party instead offers a three-pillar 
approach to fighting terrorism: respect for fundamental rights and freedoms of the Kurds, 
sustaining economic development and providing security in the region29. 
Eliminating, or at least minimizing, the developmental gap between regions was 
presented as an important aspect of the solution, even though economic improvement was but 
part of the solution to the Kurdish problem. The Program presented economic measures as the 
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third pillar of the policy along with providing cultural rights and fighting terrorism. According to 
the AKP leadership, “lack of public services, unemployment, poverty, and oppression [created] 
situations where terror [could] flourish most conveniently30.” Improving trade, especially border 
trade with neighboring countries, was offered as a viable solution to the low economic activity in 
the region. 
Consequently, the Program posits that a bureaucratic and authoritarian state relying solely on 
the concept of security will exacerbate the problems even further in the long term. Therefore, 
democratic principles and pluralism should replace security concerns if we are to protect the 
unity and integrity of our nation in the long term, how unfavorable it may sound initially31. 
This Party Program has constituted the basis of the AKP discourse and activities since the 
establishment of the Party. For example, during the propaganda period of 2002 elections, 
Erdogan made several references to the Party Program with regards to the Kurdish problem and 
his Party’s solution to it. In 2002, in his Hakkari and Diyarbakir speeches, which were his first 
election speeches as the leader of the AKP, Erdogan stressed the existence of different ethnic 
groups in Turkey, and promised that there will be no religious, ethnic or regional discrimination 
when the AKP came to power32. In Cizre, he added that the villagers that were forced to leave 
their villages due to terrorism would be able to return to their homes after a rehabilitation 
project33. 
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During this period, Erdogan met the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Jalal 
Talabani in his office. In this meeting, Erdogan stated  “the information he got on Iraq and 
Kurdistan made him happy, and he wished that the relations would be closer in the future34.” 
Yet, these two sentences were enough to start a fire amongst the Kemalist elites situated in the 
media and political parties. The AKP needed to clarify that Erdogan used Kurdistan for the 
limited geographic region in the north of Iraq, which at the same time happened to be the name 
of Jalal Talabani’s party35. 
Consequently, these early period policy promises, and emphasis on pluralism and democracy 
earned the AKP 32,2% of votes in Eastern and 26,5% in Southeastern Anatolia36. In other words, 
the AKP was either the first or the second party in twelve Kurdish cities37, even though on 
average it gained less than half of the electoral support that DEHAP obtained in East and 
Southeastern provinces (Carkoglu, 2002). 
European Union Alignment Packages and Kurdish culture: 
With the adoption of the "National Program" in the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(TGNA) on 19 March 2001, the issue of constitutional change landed on top of the political 
agenda. With this document, Turkey promised to fulfill certain reforms before becoming eligible 
for full member to the EU. In accordance with the short-term and mid-term goals in the National 
Program, the Government consisting of Democratic Left Party (DSP), Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) gave priority to the preparation of a 
new constitutional amendment package in accordance with the EU standards. Among these 
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standards were the expansion of fundamental rights and freedoms, the abolition of death penalty, 
obstruction of party closure by presenting a gradual punishment system for those that indulge in 
unconstitutional activities, legalization of broadcasting and publishing in local languages “that 
has been prohibited by law”, and incorporation of fair trial to the Constitution. 
However, these amendments did not change the century-old mentality of Turkish 
Kemalists. In 2000, in a meeting with Socialists Group in the European Parliament, Prime 
Minister Bulent Ecevit, the leader of the coalition partner DSP, announced that Kurdish was not 
a language 38 . In 2002, after the amendments, the coalition was still discussing whether 
broadcasting in Kurdish was a threat to national security39 and contended that Kurdish language 
was not suitable for education40. Accordingly, national unity and territorial integrity of the 
country were at risk due to such EU demands41, and therefore a possible EU membership was a 
first step towards the dissolution of Turkish Republic as intended by the allied forces after the 
World War 142. 
In this atmosphere, AKP leadership repeatedly suggested the localization and the 
implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria as ‘Ankara criteria’ with or without EU membership, 
(Ugur & Yankaya, 2008). After the elections in November 2002, the AKP government issued a 
program and an action plan that stressed the EU reforms as the basis for upcoming 
constitutional/legal reforms. Despite all the controversy, EU membership was a Kemalist project 
beginning in 1960s, and the AKP chose to use their weapons against them to legitimize its 
political agenda. 
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One of the first actions of the AKP government was to put an end to the state of 
emergency that affected the Kurdish areas43.  Then, the AKP government adopted five reform 
packages from 2002 to 2007. These reform packages abolished Article 8 of Anti-Terror Law 
and allowed for broadcasting in languages and dialects other than Turkish. Moreover, the 
reforms enabled private Kurdish courses, naming children in Kurdish, and propagating in 
elections in local languages other than Turkish44. 
The first Kurdish private course was opened in Batman on April 2nd, 2004 after an enormous 
bureaucratic controversy45.  On the other hand, people had to wait until 2009 to watch the first 
full-time Kurdish broadcasting in Turkish Radio and Television (TRT)46-with a 7-year delay 
again due to bureaucratic obstacles. 
During this five year-reform period, the AKP government supported the reform packages with 
discursive changes as well. For example, in October 2004, the Human Rights Commission, 
responsible to the office of Prime Minister, published a minority report. The report primarily 
contended that the usage of race-based “Turk” as a supra-identity created many problems for 
Turkish society. “Turk” happened to be the name of one of the sub-identities in the society that 
lived under the supra-nationality of “Ottoman” for centuries without any problems47. The 
suggestion of the Commission was to find another supra-nationality that was territory based and 
more inclusive, like “Turkiyeli48.” 
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Without doubt, these suggestions created a storm in Turkish politics, and even the AKP 
government had to announce, “the Report had been prepared without the knowledge or 
permission of the government49.” 
Nevertheless, the words were out there, and after a year, Erdogan began to talk in full 
agreement with the report. In 2005 during a meeting in Kurdish city Siirt, he announced, “every 
ethnic group in Turkey will be called in the name of its ethnicity. They are all sub-nationalities. 
And the supra nationality uniting all will be the citizenship of Turkish Republic50.” In a historic 
speech in Diyarbakir, he pointed out that he had been, and still was, against any regional and 
ethnic separatist movements while he approved cultural pluralism.  According to Erdogan, there 
was a “Kurdish problem” in the country, and it was not confined to a limited group of people. It 
was the problem of all51.  He also recited a famous poem demanding “an end to the fight between 
brothers52.” 
The government also tried to take a step towards decentralization of power, in the same lines 
with the suggestions of all Kurdish reports published in 1990s and later. According to the 
proposal, the authority should be transferred from the national government to local 
administrations, and thereby, strengthen the participation of the local people in their 
governance53. Due to the controversy it created, the AKP government drew back the proposal. 
5.2.TUSIAD 
Starting from the Jon Turk movement during the late Ottoman Empire era, the 
replacement of the existing, non-Muslim “comprador” bourgeoisie with a national one was on 
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top of the political agenda of Turkish nationalists. National bourgeoisie was the backbone of an 
economically independent nation state. Therefore, after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, 
the Kemalist state dedicated itself to creating the new class with government subsidies, tax 
reductions, concessions, credits and laws that protected entrepreneurs. In order to get larger 
shares from such privileges, enterprises articulated high-rank bureaucrats and politicians to their 
bodies. 
In addition to the economic policies of the Kemalist state, Turkish bourgeoisie benefited 
from the rising racism in Europe during 1930’s. Most of the non-Muslim entrepreneurs either 
forced out of the country due to increasing anonymous assaults or had to pay higher and 
additional taxes. 
Moreover, until 1980, the Kemalist state refrained from liberalism and applied import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) policies, which increased the dependence of the national 
bourgeoisie to state for import/export privileges and policies. 
Such dependence of the Turkish bourgeoisie to the Kemalist state led to an organic, 
clientelist relation between the upper middle classes and the Kemalist state structure not only 
economically but also ideologically. In other words, Turkish bourgeoisie has been the most 
enthusiastic supporter of the Kemalist ideals and the state structure for decades. 
Founded in 1971, Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) represents the 
national secular bourgeoisie mentioned above, which -after all- was a Kemalist project. The 
Association defines itself as a voluntary entrepreneurial organization with members from the 
major industrial and service companies in Turkey54. TUSIAD members produce 50% of 
Turkey’s GDP (excluding government sector) and 80% of its foreign trade (excluding natural 
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resource imports)55. Concentrated mainly in Istanbul, TUSIAD operates as an independent, 
West-oriented, non-governmental organization that supports research and policy discussion on 
important socio-economic issues in Turkey (Gunter & Yavuz, 2007). 
In the early 1990s, TÜSIAD campaigned for legal and institutional reforms aimed at 
enhancing the institutional quality of Turkey’s economy. “However, its reforms vision was 
limited to economic governance and optimal size of the state. This vision underwent a significant 
expansion with the conclusion of the EU–Turkey customs union (CU) in 1995,” (Ugur & 
Yankaya, 2008, p.588). After 1995, TÜSIAD began to campaign for extensive democratization 
and protection of the individual rights vis-à-vis the state (Onis, 1997). “An important reason for 
this change was the perception that the CU could constitute a stepping stone toward EU 
membership as it would enable Turkey to achieve the necessary economic and political maturity 
to be a full member of the EU” (TÜSIAD 1996, 5; 1997a, 4),” (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.588). 
In short, TUSIAD had the perception that the prospect of EU membership provided “a sense 
of legitimacy” that would reduce resistance to comprehensive reforms within the state and the 
society. Therefore, TUSIAD published highly controversial and influential reports on EU 
membership of Turkey from 1997 onward. 
5.2.1. THE WELFARE’S RELATION WITH TUSIAD: 
The pinnacle of the Welfare Party ideology and its economic policy guide was the Just 
Order. The Just Order was a guiding ideological prism that mainly concentrated on economic 
matters and presented prescriptions for Turkey’s economic diseases. 
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First of all, the Party stressed that the Just Order not be confused with either capitalism or 
communism. According to the Just Order, capitalism had “five viruses” causing “sixteen 
diseases,” (Kamrava, 1998). The viruses were “interest rates, unfair taxes, the mint, the banking 
system, and the exchange system. The most awful diseases spreading via these viruses were 
hunger, poverty, high prices, inflation, the mafia, corruption, moral decay, backwardness, wars, 
and exploitation,” (Kamrava, 1998, p. 287). Communism, on the other hand, was a bankrupt 
ideology and a twin brother of capitalism: both were the systems where there was an oppressor 
and an oppressed. The only difference between the two economic systems was that the oppressor 
force was political power in communism and capital power in capitalism. 
Instead, the Welfare Party offered Just Economic Order, in which the economic system 
would remain under the complete control of market forces, and state involvement in the 
economy was merely regulatory (Kamrava, 1998). 
As for the foreign policy, the Just Order was based on classic dependency arguments. In 
his words, Erbakan described the West as “imperialist Zionists that [were] dedicated to the 
exploitation of the Islamic countries56.” Erbakan also claimed that the West was trying to divide 
Turkey by “manipulating Kurds and playing Muslim brethren against each other57.” 
In sum, even TUSIAD and the Welfare Party were completely at odds with each other not 
only with regards to their political ideologies but also with regards to their economy and foreign 
policy expectations. 
5.2.2. THE AKP’S RELATION WITH TUSIAD: 
The Party Program of the AKP was almost perfect for reassuring the TUSIAD that their 
economic and political agenda would be fulfilled. In the Program, it was explicitly stated “[the 
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Party] favors market economy operating with all its institutions and rules,” and the function of 
the state in the economy [was] limited to a regulator and controller58.” Moreover, under the title 
of “Our Concept of the Economy,” the AKP announced that “[their] relations with the European 
Union, World Bank, IMF and other international institutions [shall] be maintained along the lines 
of the requirements of [their] economy and [their] national interests.59” 
Meanwhile, TUSIAD published reports after reports, and called governments, opposition 
parties, and relevant ministries and committees to maintain the momentum for the compatibility 
between EU criteria and Turkish legal system. Yet, “the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government 
from 1998-2002 tended to distance itself from the reform agenda. TUSIAD criticized the 
government for this reluctance, and also related the twin crises of November 2000 and February 
2001 to the government’s lack of political determination and its economic/financial 
mismanagement,” (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.590).  
In this atmosphere, the AKP incorporated the EU policy conditions on its own agenda, 
and declared that the Party was committed to fulfilling Copenhagen criteria. AKP leadership 
presented the EU democratization reforms as “long-overdue policies that would benefit the 
Turkish society at large –and not as EU interference in Turkey’s domestic affairs,” (Ugur & 
Yankaya, 2008, p.590). The AKP also rejected the prejudice that the EU conditionality will 
destroy the territorial integrity and national unity of the Turkish state, and with several occasions 
stressed out that Turkey could only solve its ethnic problems with more democracy.  
As a result of this attitude, “the cooperation between TUSIAD and Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan had begun even before the foundation of the AKP on August 14, 2001,” (Ugur & 
Yankaya, 2008, p.590). In private and official meetings, Erdogan assured TUSIAD authorities 
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that he had abandoned Islamic fundamentalism; he favored a secular political system, and that 
accession to European Union was among his priorities60.  
Before the November 2002 elections, Erdogan took a face-to-face diplomacy stance with 
EU leaders, and assured them of his personal commitment as well as AKP’s determination to 
maintain EU perspective. After the elections, the AKP government issued a program and an 
action plan that underlined EU norms as the basis for upcoming legal reforms, and announced 
that the EU membership was a top priority of the government. The government also repeatedly 
stated that “its main objective was to pave the way for a Council decision to start accession 
negotiations in 2004,” and “even though the sought date came with a delay of one year in 2005, 
the AKP government remained committed to the reform agenda until the end of 2004,” (Ugur & 
Baskaya, 2008, p.591).  
Besides working as a catalyst for policy reforms on democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law, the EU conditionality provided the AKP with the necessary means to restrict the 
military’s ability to intervene in politics. With the help of the reform packages, military 
representatives in civilian bodies were replaced with civilians. With these changes, the National 
Security Council, which was “an organ that had enabled the Turkish Armed Forces to play a 
significant and often dictating role in the determination of the government policies,” was reduced 
to an advisory board responsible to the Prime Minister (Ugur &Yankaya, 2008, p.591). 
Due to the political and economical commitments of the AKP to the EU process, 
TUSIAD described the AKP government as an opportunity for economic and political stability 
of Turkey. Accordingly, the Party had the capacity and the will for the economic and social 
transformation that the country had been longing for (TUSIAD, 2003). “Even before the election 
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of November 2002, TUSIAD backed the Party’s active engagement with the EU and declared its 
support both in Turkey and in European capitals. Thereby, it lent the AKP government the 
crucial support it needed against veto players such as the military and the judiciary,” (Ugur & 
Yankaya, 2008, p.593). 
5.3.MUSIAD 
Established in 1990 by five industrialists and businessmen, Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD), is a non-governmental, non-profit, and voluntary-based, 
businessmen’s association that is based on the small and medium size enterprises of traditional 
Anatolian cities. 
MUSIAD have emerged in a historical period characterized by major changes in both the 
domestic and the international economic and political arena. On the domestic level, the state 
abandoned the import substitution industrialization and embraced neoliberal economic policies 
with all its classical policy suggestions. On the international level, “it was a period characterized 
by the rise of small and medium size enterprises associated with the downsizing of large firms 
and the decentralization of vertically integrated enterprises,” (Sen, 2010, p.72). 
In accordance with the neoliberal economy policies, the growth of MUSIAD was 
independent of any state protection. Unable to benefit from the state’s preferential treatment like 
its counterpart TUSIAD, MUSIAD mostly supported collective rights and social justice as 
opposed to individual rights. Moreover, unlike TUSIAD, MUSIAD has been a more Eastern 
oriented association that is heavily influenced by the successful cases of East and Southeast Asia 
(Onis, 1997).  
In addition to the neoliberal economy policies, there were other factors that helped the 
emergence and rapid growth of MUSIAD. Following the Naqshi Sufi tradition himself, Turgut 
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Ozal, the former Prime Minister of Turkey (1983–1989) and former President of Turkey (1989–
1993), “generously favored Islamist groups in the economic, cultural, and political arena and 
played a crucial role in the emergence of a new business class, affiliated with the organized 
religious groups,” (Sen, 2010, p.72). International Islamic banks and financial institutions made 
their appearance in Turkey in the 1980’s and provided “halal” credit for the Islamic bourgeoisie 
in Anatolia. These institutions also helped some local enterprises “to establish economic links 
with the Middle Eastern countries, especially in construction, oil, trade, and transportation,” 
(Sen, 2010, p.72).  
In fact, these small and medium size enterprises had no option other than turning their 
face to the East, since the West –European Common Market- was already tied up to TUSIAD. 
With the help of the state protection, and a Western oriented foreign and economy policy, 
TUSIAD was able to make connections with the European countries. Therefore, the new middle 
class represented by MUSIAD depended on the fruits of globalization and relied their personal 
connections with Middle Eastern countries for their exports. Therefore, MUSIAD worked hard to 
improve the cooperation and trade between Islamic countries under the leadership of Ali 
Bayramoglu.  
Economically; MUSIAD demanded the promotion of small and medium-sized firms and 
the mobilization of public resources and the financial system towards this end. Politically; it 
strongly rejected the Customs Union with Europe and demanded the reorientation of the 
country’s political and economic relationship towards the East61 (Onis, 1997; Bayramoglu, 
2008).   
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5.3.1. THE WELFARE’S RELATION WITH MUSIAD: 
There is a consensus in the literature that “the transformation of the Welfare Party from a 
marginal force to a significant political movement is a parallel phenomenon to and a reflection of 
the growing power of Islamic business in the Turkish economy and society in the context of the 
1990s,” (Onis, 1997, p.760; Gulalp, 1999). Considering the role of the state as the allocator of 
rents in the main economic areas, Islamic bourgeoisie needed and supported Islamic movements 
at the political level to get greater share from the public resources pie (Onis, 1997). 
As part of its anti-West ideology, the Welfare’s primary goal of bringing Turkey and 
Islamic world closer perfectly aligned with that of MUSIAD’s demands. Erbakan particularly 
emphasized the importance of strengthening relations with countries of the Middle East, the 
emerging states of post-Soviet Central Asia and the rising states of Southeast Asia with large 
Islamic populations. 
At one level, the Welfare’s approach was transnationalism in the sense that the Party 
emphasized the brotherhood of and cooperation among Islamic countries. At the same time, there 
was a strong nationalistic flavor to its foreign-policy approach since Turkey was presented as the 
natural leader of this cooperation (Onis, 1997).  In its 1995 Election Manifesto, the Welfare Party 
declared that its foreign policy goal was making “Turkey a leader country, not a satellite state.” 
And for the fulfillment of this objective, Turkey had to be in the union of World Islamic 
Countries, “not a Christian club that was founded by the command of the Papa Pio the XII62.” 
Not surprisingly, the Welfare Party was extremely critical of any future union with 
Europe and promised to “dismantle the Customs Union agreement signed in 1995,” defining it a 
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betrayal of the history, the civilization, the culture and most importantly the independence of 
Turkey63. 
In accordance with this political stance, the Welfare leadership started its official foreign 
visits with Iran, Egypt and Libya after forming the government. However, these visits and the 
overall East-oriented foreign policy of the Welfare Party led to a massive opposition from the 
military as well as the parties of center-right and social left. The opposition was in favor of the 
traditional Turkish foreign policy and argued there was no benefit of building relations with 
countries that were isolated by the international community other than impairing the relations 
with the West. After all, the West represented progress and modernity -everything Turkey longed 
for, and the East represented backwardness and underdevelopment -everything Turkey escaped 
from. 
Nevertheless, even though the Welfare Party remained loyal to the Customs Union 
agreement and Turkey’s memberships in the international institutions, it did not stop 
emphasizing the importance of having an “Islamic NATO” or an “Islamic Customs Union” 
throughout its rule. 
5.3.2. THE AKP’S RELATION WITH MUSIAD: 
Contrary to the Welfare Party, the AKP announced in its Party Program that Turkey’s 
relations with the European Union, World Bank, IMF and other international institutions would 
be maintained along the lines of the requirements of Turkish economy and national interests64. In 
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addition to that, the Program assured the opposition and the West that the relations with the 
European Union, NATO, and the USA would not only be maintained, but also be intensified65. 
After stating that Turkey would remain loyal to current axes of Turkish foreign policy, 
the Party presented the end of the Cold War as an opportunity for the country to rearrange its 
relations with alternative power centers, flexibly and with many axes. These power centers 
consisted of regional countries (neighbors and the Middle Eastern countries), Turkic Republics 
of Central Asia, former Eastern Bloc countries in the Black Sea, China, Russia, Balkans, 
Caucasus, and specifically Islamic countries. The Program noted that it attributed particular 
importance to the relations with Islamic countries.  Accordingly, “it shall make efforts for the 
increase of the bilateral cooperation with these nations on the one hand, while continuing 
attempts on the other for the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to have a more 
respectable place in the international arena and to have a dynamic structure able to take 
initiatives. Again in this conjunction, it shall try to impart more substance to the work of the 
standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of OIC (Comcec) which is 
chaired by the President of the Republic of Turkey66.” 
In other words, the AKP rephrased and rekindled Welfare’s foreign policy. After various 
unsuccessful attempts for the full EU membership resulting with humiliation, the AKP argued 
that Turkey did not need Europe, and instead, Europe needed Turkey. Party leadership 
consistently emphasized the unique character of Turkey as “a bridge between the Muslim East 
and the Christian West67.” At a time when Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis was 
influential, the AKP co-created the initiative of “Alliance of Civilization” under UN umbrella. 
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Thereby, instead of demonizing the West and using Islam as the reference for Turkish 
foreign policy, the Party chose to give assurances that it was committed to the traditional foreign 
policy stance of Turkey, but needed to utilize other cooperation opportunities created with other 
power centers. The policy was named “Zero Problems with Neighbors” and applauded by every 
segment of the society. More interestingly, the policy was based on an apothegm of Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk: Peace at home, peace in the world! Accordingly, Ankara improved its relations 
with all of its neighbors including its archenemies such as Greece and Armenia.  
Aside from foreign policy, the AKP gave voice to the economic demands of MUSIAD as 
well. In its Party Program, the AKP underlined the importance of artisans and small and medium 
scale enterprises for Turkish economy. According to the AKP Party Program “making significant 
contributions to the creation of production, employment and added value, small and medium 
scale enterprises are the backbone of the Turkish economic and social structure68.” In addition, 
the Party suggested “a plan including, among other measures, financing support based on 
projects, tax incentives, and a plan including the reduction of bureaucratic obstacles.” Moreover, 
it promised protection from unfair competition to tradesmen, artisans and small and medium 
scale enterprises against large corporations. For this purpose, Small and Medium Enterprises 
Development Organization, found in 1990, was used more actively and effectively. Not only the 
supported sectors69 but also the budget70 of the organization expanded between 2002 and 2007. 
5.4.CONSERVATIVES 
Turkey’s modernization process dates back to Tanzimat reforms (1839) during the late 
Ottoman rule and takes a more radical and transformative stance with the founding of the 
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Turkish Republic. Educated in European capitals and influenced by their ideologies, Young 
Turks believed that the Empire needed fundamental reforms to be able to compete with its 
European counterparts, both militarily and economically. Moreover, the ideals of French 
Revolution were spreading throughout the continent and Ottomans were not exempt from their 
influence. However, these early modernization efforts never denied the significance of Islam for 
the society. Islam was not incompatible with modernization according to Young Turks and their 
ultimate goals were “Turkification, Islamization, and modernization” of the society. 
Nevertheless, this benign perception of religion changed under the leadership of the 
following Ottoman intellectuals, among whom Ataturk was a prominent actor. According to 
these nationalists, religion was the reason Ottoman Empire missed the modernization train. Even 
though most of the Anatolian peasants who fought in the Independence War believed that they 
were saving the Caliph, Mustafa Kemal was determined to erase religion from the public sphere 
after the founding of Turkish Republic. French secularism was accepted as one of the six 
principles of Kemalism, has been heavily used to control the religion by the state (Cavdar, 2006). 
To this end, Ataturk abolished the Sultanate (1922), and the Caliphate (1924); issued 
Tevhid-i Tedrisat law which ordered the ban on every school and curriculum (religious schools 
and those belonged to minorities) except the official state schools and curriculum (1924); banned 
the use of fez, and issued a law on hat usage and appropriate dressing (1925); prohibited Sufi 
orders, and dervish lodges (1925); accepted a new civil law, and abolished the old sharia-based 
one (1926); replaced the Arab alphabet with the Latin one(1928); and removed the phrase “The 
religion of the Turkish Republic is Islam.” from the 1924 Constitution (1928).  In addition to 
these reforms strengthening the secular character of the state, Mustafa Kemal issued an order that 
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prohibited the Arabic version of the call to the prayer (1932) – a law that was effective until the 
election failure of CHP in 1950. 
From the early years of the Republic, secularism has been accepted as the most important 
character of the state and guarded by the military and Kemalist elites. In a country where 99% of 
the population is Muslim, the top-down secular reforms of Kemalist regime polarized the society 
to a great extent. Muslim population felt more and more oppressed and marginalized as years 
passed. 
The 1980 military coup was a milestone in this state policy because the new military 
regime decided to use religion as a legitimizing tool for promoting political stability. “Without 
changing the state’s promise of secularism, a notion called Turkish-Islamic synthesis was 
adopted by the military,” (Cavdar, 2006, p.487). During this period, the state founded the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs; incorporated mandatory religion classes to the national 
curriculum; opened vocational schools that train imams; and broadcasted increased number of 
religious programs on state-owned television. Yet with the continuing emphasis on secularism, 
not much changed in terms of how Muslim masses perceive themselves vis-à-vis state. 
In addition to economic crises, three-digit inflation numbers, and skyrocketed 
unemployment rates, scandals of high-rank state officials –and even Prime Minister Tansu Ciller 
herself- broke out one after another in 1990s. However, contrary to the expectation of the left, 
lower classes living in the newly established suburbs of big cities responded these developments 
by redefining their identity in religious terms instead of class. The prevalent perception was that 
Muslims have been oppressed and marginalized not only culturally, but also economically. The 
two most significant symbols of this oppression were the ban on headscarf in public spaces and 
the marginalization of vocational schools after 28 February process. 
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5.4.1. THE WELFARE’S RELATION WITH CONSERVATIVES: 
In his 1994 and 1995 election speeches, Erbakan continually emphasized the discrepancy 
between the Muslim majority and Kemalist elites. According to Erbakan, there were only two 
political parties in Turkey: The Welfare Party with its Just Order Program, and others who are 
collaborators, imitators of the West, and (willingly or unwillingly) servants of the Zionist 
interests. Therefore, he contended that the Welfare Party had “believers” whereas others had 
“voters.” In a party group meeting he also added that the Welfare Party would definitely rule 
Turkey, and establish Just Order. The question was whether the transition would be with or 
without blood71. 
According to the leadership of the WP, there were three spheres of confrontation in 
Turkish society: “ideological (left versus right and Islamist versus both Marxist and capitalist), 
ethnic (Turk versus Kurd), and religious (different sects of Islam such as Sunni versus Alawite),” 
(Yavuz, 1997). The leadership insisted the solution of all these confrontations lied in state-
centric Islam. Accordingly, the Welfare Party redefined the principles of Kemalism as 
rationalism, independence, indigenous development, industrialization and reaching the level of 
modern civilization and reinterpreted secularism as the freedom of religion to Sunni Muslims 
(Duran, 1998). 
Before the elections, the Party focused its discourse on the exploitative relationship 
between the West and the Muslim world and delineated the Kemalist elites as an offshoot of that 
imperialist West. Yet, after coming to power, the actions and the discourse of the WP were not as 
radical. For example, contrary to its early discourse, the Party signed a military agreement with 
Israel and remained loyal to the Customs Union Agreement with the EU. 
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As a result of this change in its actions and discourse, the WP felt the need to appease and 
appeal to its conservative constituency via number of events. These events included “the WP's 
insistence on building a mosque at Taksim with the claim to recapture Istanbul. The November 
10th, 1996 speech of the WP's Kayseri Mayor, Sukru Karatepe, in which he urged Muslims to 
'nurse and preserve the hatred and vengefulness they felt inside until their day comes.' The iftar 
dinner, to which Prime Minister Erbakan had invited the leaders of the religious orders. And the 
'Jerusalem Night' celebrations in the township of Sincan near Ankara. At this rally, under the 
posters of the leaders of Hamas and Hizbullah, Sincan Mayor Bekir Yildiz and the Iranian 
Ambassador to Ankara, Mohammad Baghari, delivered messages that irritated some sections of 
the Turkish public opinion,” (Yavuz, 1997). 
5.4.2. THE AKP’S RELATION WITH CONSERVATIVES:  
Contrary to the WP, the AKP refrained from making direct references to Islam in their 
discourse and party documents. First of all, the AKP declared itself neither a religious nor an 
Islamic party. Rather, it was a “conservative democratic party.” Erdogan refused any 
resemblance to even the “Christian Democrats” of Europe. 
Second, the Party leadership redefined “secularism” in accordance with the Anglo-Saxon 
usage of the term. According to Erdogan, the source of the oppression of the freedom of religion 
and consciousness in Turkey was the application of French type secularism. Instead of a secular 
state that considers controlling the religion as one of its primary duties, Erdogan offered a 
secularism definition that guarantees the freedom of all faiths, as well as non-believers72. 
Moreover, secularism was a feature of states, and therefore only states could be secular, not real 
persons. 
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Third, in its Party Program under the “Fundamental Rights and Freedoms” section, the 
AKP explicitly stated its stance towards religion with three Articles, and denounced the state 
ideology that uses secularism as a tool for oppression against pious citizens: 
• “Our party considers religion as one of the most important institutions of humanity and 
secularism as a pre-requisite of democracy, and an assurance of the freedom of religion 
and conscience. It also rejects the interpretation and distortion of secularism as enmity 
against religion. 
• Basically, secularism is a principle which allows people of all religions, and beliefs to 
comfortably practice their religions, to be able to express their religious convictions and 
live accordingly, but which also allows people without beliefs to organize their lives 
along these lines. From this point of view, secularism is a principle of freedom and social 
peace. 
• Our Party refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use 
them for political purposes. It considers the attitudes and practices that disturb pious 
people, and which discriminate them due to their religious lives and preferences, as anti-
democratic and in contradiction to human rights and freedoms. On the other hand, it is 
also unacceptable to make use of religion for political, economic and other interests, or to 
put pressure on people who think and live differently by using religion.” 
Fourth, during his 2002 election campaign in conservative cities such as Gaziantep, 
Karaman, and Konya, in reply to questions concerning the headscarf issue Erdogan assured the 
people in the meeting arena that the country would become “a land of freedoms,” after they came 
to power only if conservatives were patient73. He also added that the Party would equally fight 
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against groups that exploit religion for their own interests and the groups that oppress pious 
people in the name of fighting against the exploitation of religion74. 
And last, but not least, the AKP emphasized the significance of “social convention” for 
the solution of secularism problem in Turkey. Contrary to the WP’s radical discourse that 
seemed to be dedicated to changing the regime, the AKP chose to remove each and every 
obstacle with the help of “social convention” of different groups in the society. In other words, 
the AKP tried to let sleeping dogs lie after what had happened to the WP and its Islamic 
discourse. 
After its 2002 election victory, the AKP was entirely silent on the demands of the 
conservatives with regards to the headscarf and vocational training issues. The primary emphasis 
was on the “democratic” character of the Turkish state and its consolidation through the EU 
membership. 
However, that door also closed for the AKP after a serious of “wrong” decisions on the 
EU side. First, the European Court of Human Rights approved the closure of the Welfare Party. 
Next, the EU strongly rejected the AKP’s insistence on accepting adultery as a crime. 
Consequently, a decision by European Court of Human Rights in 2005 sealed the deal for the 
headscarf issue and puzzled the AKP on its stance towards the EU membership. In a case against 
the Turkish state, the Court found the Turkish state not guilty for banning the headscarf in public 
spaces (especially in universities), and declared that secularism was essential for maintaining the 
democratic system in Turkey75. This decision unsurprisingly disappointed the leadership of the 
AKP. Bulent Arinc, a prominent party leader and then the President of National Assembly, was 
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sure that the next president of Turkey will allow headscarf in Cankaya76 (the city of residence for 
Presidents), while Abdullah Gul, another prominent figure in the AKP as former PM opposed the 
decision stating  “Prohibitions honors no one77.” However, the AKP continued to play its 
“patience” card with the conservative constituency regarding the headscarf and vocational 
schools problems. 
It was not until the repulse of the military with an election victory in 2007 that the Party 
leadership changed their stance towards these issues and admitted during the controversial 
Constitution amendments of 2008 that they had been patient for the last five years regarding the 
headscarf issue, and now was the time to solve it since there was a convention between 
institutions in addition to the societal convention78. 
5.5.LIBERALS  
There has always been a group of intellectuals from both right and left of the ideological 
spectrum that –despite the iron fist of the state- consistently denounced the violation of human 
rights by Turkish state. These liberals demanded an immediate change in state’s attitude 
emphasizing that torture; death under custody, missing people (mostly under detention), murders 
whose perpetrators are unknown had become a common practice throughout 1980s and 1990s. 
These liberals mostly consisted of university students, academicians, journalists, intellectuals, 
human right NGOSs, artists, relatives of the victims, etc. 
Providing a voter base that is not affiliated with any existing systemic party, the liberals 
longed for a competent government that would punish the perpetrators of atrocities, expand 
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democratic rights, respect the rule of law and human rights, and transform the garrison state of 
1980s and 1990s into a modern democracy. 
5.5.1. THE WELFARE’S RELATION WITH LIBERALS: 
The WP was hardly suited for challenging the century-long state security ideology and 
filling human rights and democracy gap. First of all, the Party was dedicated to demonizing the 
West and all Western institutions, including human rights and democracy. One of his party group 
speeches, Erbakan even contended that The West was trying to tear apart the territorial integrity 
of Turkey by provoking the imperialist agenda under the disguise of democracy and human 
rights79. 
Second, the WP supported this discourse with its policies towards the people who 
demanded more democracy and human rights, as well as punishment of the perpetrators of past 
atrocities. In fact, the Party maintained the old security-centric state ideology after coming to 
power. For example, influenced by the mothers of the Plaza del Mayo, in the midst of 1995 
mothers of disappeared started a civil disobedience initiative that entailed convening in 
Galatasaray Square (Istanbul) every Saturday. Their primary objective was to create a public 
opinion and opposition against the disappearances under detention and murders whose 
perpetrators are unknown, learn about the fate of their children, and ask for the punishment of 
perpetrators. The group received a substantial support from journalists, some sensible MPs, 
students, academics and some segments of the public. (Kocali, 2004). Starting from the summer 
of 1996, which happened to be the period of WP and True Path Party coalition government, the 
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police began using force against the Saturday Mothers. Arrests, interrogations, police brutality, 
etc. used to prevent the group from convening in Galatasaray Square (Kocali, 2004). 
Another example of the WP’s contempt and ridicule against the demands of liberals 
showed itself during the protests of November 1996. One of the biggest scandals of Turkey was 
surfaced after a car accident in the small city of Susurluk, Balikesir. The victims of the accident 
included the deputy chief of the Istanbul police, a parliament deputy from a powerful Kurdish 
clan, and the leader of a mafiatic organization who was on Interpol's red list. In other words, the 
accident revealed that most of the murders in the Kurdish regions, as well as the drug trafficking, 
had taken place in the hands of the state itself. 
Not surprisingly, several demonstrations were organized in protest against the corruption 
and illegal activities uncovered by the investigations. A popular nation-wide event was held to 
protest the state mafia relations. Participants all around the country turned off the lights for a 
minute every night to show their discontent. Later, this protest evolved into a protest against the 
Welfare Party and its reactionary agenda. Nevertheless, instead of investigating the incident 
properly, and punishing people who were involved, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan called 
them "parasites and conspirators...who have nothing to do apart from intrigue." Minister of 
Justice, Sevket Kazan, even implied that these protestors were playing sexual games, including 
incest relations80. 
5.5.2. THE AKP’S RELATION WITH LIBERALS: 
In its Party Program, the AKP gave assurances to the liberals seeking democracy and 
respect for human rights with a number of objectives81, some of which are: 
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• “The fundamental human rights and freedoms are acquisitions obtained by humanity 
after struggles lasting for centuries. The level of these freedoms is an indicator of 
being a civilized society. It is also the expectation of our society to see Turkey, which 
is part of the civilized world, to be brought in the area of fundamental rights and 
freedoms to a position that it deserves. Therefore, steps must be taken because our 
people deserve these rights and freedoms, rather than because international 
institutions want them to be taken. 
•  Standards in the area of human rights contained in the international agreements to 
which Turkey is a party, especially in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
European Convention on Human Rights, Paris Charter and Helsinki Final Act shall be 
put into force. 
• Practices such as torture, death under custody, missing people, murders whose 
perpetrators are unknown, which are unacceptable in a democracy. State of law shall 
be seriously prosecuted, transparency shall be ensured. Complaints of all citizens in 
this subject shall be considered, the necessary arrangements shall be made to provide 
deterrence, and those responsible shall not go without punishment.” 
In addition The AKP recognized Kurdish identity and its rights, promoted the freedom of 
religion and consciousness, embraced the EU and the Copenhagen criteria that institutionalized 
human rights and the rule of law. The Party also emphasized its commitment to democracy 
numerous times, was eager to solve problems through societal convention, aimed at limiting the 
role of the military in politics, and presented secularism as a guarantor rather than an obstacle to 
all religious freedom. These policies and promises appealed to the democrat group seeking 
change. 
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6. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: THE STRUGGLE 
6.1. THE WELFARE PARTY AND THE FEBRUARY 28 PROCESS 
6 March 1996 Even though Erbakan’s Welfare Party won the 1995 election with a 
21.7% vote share, President Suleyman Demirel gave the duty of government formation to 
another party with 19.65% vote share contrary to the tradition. The leader of ANAVATAN 
Mesut Yilmaz managed to convince his biggest rival and mortal enemy Tansu Ciller, the head of 
the True Path Party, to form a coalition (ANAYOL) so that the rule of the Welfare could be 
prevented. 
March-April 1996 The Welfare Party asked for a parliament interrogation for Tansu 
Ciller, claiming that she had indulged in corruption during the privatization of TOFAS and 
TEDAS, and requested a resolution of her assets. 
14 May 1996 Due to the claims of the Welfare Party that the vote of confidence for 
ANAYOL coalition was against the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court annulled the ANAYOL government. 
25 May 1996 Erbakan warned Mesut Yilmaz through the media that if Yilmaz did not 
return the unearned PM chair, they would have to force him out of power by force. 
June 1996 Erbakan announced, “Anyone who gets into a coalition with the WP will 
become as innocent as a baby,” and guaranteed Ciller that all accusations would be dropped, in 
that case. 
29 June 1996 Ciller’s DYP got into a coalition with Erbakan’s WP and formed 54th 
Government of Turkish Republic. 
• Hurriyet News: Muslims in Power 
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• President Suleyman Demirel: Nobody can play with the state. I will never ever let it 
happen82. 
• Emin Colasan, a prominent columnist in Hurriyet newspaper: We feel sick. The farce 
comedy begins. (Referring to the rule of the WP in his articles) 
6 October 1996 Erbakan pays his last visit to Libya in a tour including Iran, Nigeria, and 
Egypt. 
• Hurriyet: What impudence! 
• Sabah: Scandal in Cairo! 
• Hurriyet: The millet (society) will bring you to the court! 
• Bulent Ecevit (former leader of the CHP and the head of the Democratic Leftist 
Party –DSP): This trip of shame shall not be recorded in official state archives. 
• Tansu Ciller: Qaddafi once again made a historic mistake. In response to the 
statements of a desert Bedouin, we would bang our fist on the table. 
• Deniz Baykal (the leader of the CHP): In these past 70 years, Turkish Republic 
has had 53 prime ministers, and none of them have been insulted as Erbakan did 
during his Libya visit. It did not happen. It could not, cannot and must not occur! 
3 November 1996 Susurluk scandal 
• Ciller: The people who shoot and who get shot for the state are equally honorable. 
(Defending the mafia-state relations) 
Late 1996 The headlines were all about Mehmet Gunduz, the leader of Aczmendiler (a 
Sufi order), and the sex scandals he got involved.  Allegedly Gunduz took advantage of his 
position and forced a 24-year-old disciple into a sexual relationship. (Only after years, the 
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disciple accepted that everything was a part of a plot that designed to defame the Welfare Party 
by showing the real character of the Sufi orders it was closely connected to.) 
• Deniz Baykal (CHP): It is the WP government that encourages this kind of 
behavior and this type of people. 
      1-28 February 1997 "Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık" ("One minute's 
darkness for the sake of perpetual light" protests aroused all over the country, which started as a 
protest against the covering of Susurluk scandals and evolved into a secular protest against the 
WP.) 
• Erbakan: These protestors are nothing but "parasites and conspirators...who have 
nothing to do apart from intrigue. 
Early 1997 Erbakan pronounced that an ostentatious mosque would be built at the heart 
of the Taksim Square 
• Erbakan (regarding the debates and opposition on the issue): When we ask a 
villager in an Anatolian city his opinion about the mosque project, he would only 
say “May God bless you!” So then, who are you to oppose? 
9 January 1997 The Government issued a regulation and granted the military officials 
the right to intervene in political processes in provinces and municipalities. Accordingly military 
representatives were assigned to civil institutions such as the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (RTUK), The Council of Higher Education (YOK), and The Turkish Radio and 
Television Corporation (TRT). 
11 January 1997 Erbakan hosted an iftar dinner in the official Prime Minister’s housing 
in Cankaya. The guest comprised of the leaders of the Sufi orders (Tariqah) in Turkey. It was the 
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first time in the history of the Republic that the very Sufi leaders that the Kemalist state declared 
war in 1923 were hosted in an official state building by the head of the Turkish government. 
• Hurriyet: The Sultane of the Tariqahs 
• Bulent Ecevit (the leader of the DSP and former head of the CHP): In a period in 
which the legitimacy of some tariqahs is being questioned, this iftar gave the 
impression that the state itself has been protecting them. 
22 January 1997 High-rank military officials hold a summit in Golcuk and discussed the 
threat of “irtica” (reactionary movements) governing the country. 
30 January 1997 Sincan mayor, a member of the Welfare Party, organized the Jerusalem 
Night celebrations. At this rally, under the posters of the leaders of Hamas and Hizbullah, Sincan 
Mayor Bekir Yildiz and the Iranian Ambassador to Ankara, Mohammad Baghari, warned some 
powers in Turkish society about the anger of Muslims. After this event, Sincan Mayor Bekir 
Yildiz was put in prison. 
• Bulent Ecevit (the leader of the DSP and former head of the CHP): We are 
getting closer to a threat called “the Welfare Party” each day. 
• A high-rank military official: Sincan incident is a shame, a disgrace. Turkey is 
not Iran. The Turkish state is strictly attached to secularism. I condemn this 
incident with hatred and curse. 
• Necmettin Erbakan: Turkey is a secular country. Nobody has a problem with 
that. The problem is that some people want to apply secularism as the enemy of 
religion. To ring the alarm bells for the regime just because some people went 
somewhere and hanged a picture by mistake is just ridiculous. 
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31 January 1997 Erbakan granted extraordinary rights to the Secretary of the National 
Security Council. By virtue of these rights, the “Western Study Group83” was formed by the 
Turkish military under the auspices of the Office of Chief of Staff in order to "monitor Islamist 
sympathizers in the civil service and other state organs."  Composed of "intelligence experts," the 
group reportedly has numerous "sub-departments" that investigate "fundamentalists' activities 
and potential threats from radical Islamists throughout the country and abroad," including 
various levels of government, the local administration of provinces and towns, the military, "pro-
Islamist media outlets," and "pro-Islamist persons-controlled schools, and universities84" 
As part of its activities, the Western Working Group also monitored the Turkish press 
and there is "evidence that the highest levels of the Turkish military have exerted pressure on 
editors concerning content and employment of certain journalists with suspected Islamist 
sympathies85" 
• Necmettin Erbakan: They are trying to show our military as an enemy of the 
religion. Never. You will never achieve this goal. 
• Minister of National Security (A member of the Tansu Ciller’s DYP): There is 
distrust towards the Welfare Party with regards to its stance towards the main 
principles of the Republic. I must admit that I do not trust them either. 
Early February 1997 The military initiated a series of briefings on the threat of 
reactionary movements and invited secular mainstream media, judges, prosecutors, and 
governors. 
Early February 1997 A series of videotape scandals, which was serviced to the media 
by some mystery hands, shocked the country for months. One of the early recordings belonged to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Also referred to as Western Working Group, or in Turkish Bati Calisma Grubu (BCG).	  84	  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df4beb518.html	  85	  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df4beb518.html	  
 87 
Sukru Karatepe, a member of the WP and the mayor of Kayseri (a conservative city in central 
Anatolia): Do not look at my modern outfit and come to the conclusion that I am a secular 
person. We as PMs, MP, or mayors have some obligations. Yet, you as ordinary Muslims shall 
nurse and preserve the hatred and vengefulness you feel inside until our day comes. This system 
will surely be changed. 
• Sevki Yilmaz (A prominent member of the Welfare Party, and a member of the 
parliament): If you love Allah, if you love Prophet Mohammad, do not follow the 
demons of Selanik (referring to Ataturk as Selanik was his birth place). ….If you 
attempt to close the vocational school during the rule of the WP, blood would 
spill. Turkey would be worse than Algeria. 
• Hasan Huseyin Ceylan (a prominent member of the WP): Kemalism becomes an 
incredible injustice wheel. They state “It is more preferable to be a PKK 
militant than a member of reactionary movements.” You cannot solve the problem 
with this mentality. Do you want a solution? It is in Shariah. 
4 February 1997 People living in Sincan woke up in the middle of the night to the noise 
of 20 tanks and 15 armored cars, passing through the Sincan streets. 
• Turkish army: The tanks were transferring through Sincan for exercise. 
• Tansu Ciller (the leader of DYP and coalition partner): Tactlessness. We cannot 
overlook what has happened in Sincan. Nor can we ignore what has happened 
there. If anyone is willing to harm the character of this state (referring to 
democracy), we will show him his place. 
• Cevik Bir (Chief of Staff): During a press meeting in Washington, he announced 
that the army did alignment and balancing to Turkish democracy in Sincan. 
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5 February 1997 President Suleyman Demirel sent PM Necmettin Erbakan a letter 
demanding for an “immediate investigation on the reactionary elements in municipalities. 
9 February 1997 Ismail Hakki Karadayi (The Chief of Staff): Turkish army has all the 
determination in the course of protecting the indivisible integrity of the secular and democratic 
Turkish Republic. 
9 February 1997 Suleyman Demirel (President):  Taking advantage of sacred religious 
values and using them for political purposes is both a sin and a crime. 
11 February 1997 Women marched against the Shariah in Ankara. 
14 February 1997 Minister of Justice Sevket Kazan paid a visit to the former Sincan 
Mayor, who was in prison. This visit instigated the opposition to the WP even more as it gave the 
impression that the government approved what had happened in Sincan even though they 
claimed otherwise. 
17 February 1997 In a party meeting, Tansu Ciller (DYP) announced that she was not 
happy with the latest actions of the WP and added that she would warn Erbakan on the issue. 
24 February 1997 Guven Erkaya (First Commander of the Marine Corps and a 
prominent member of the National Security Council): Political reaction is a more dangerous 
threat than PKK. 
28 February 1997 The National Security Council was assembled. The military wing of 
the NSC demanded the issuing of a NSC decision consisted of 18 articles, some of which stated 
that: 
1. “Compulsory education will be immediately extended to 8 years.  [The measure was 
aimed at abolishing the secondary part of the vocational schools (IHLs)]. 
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2. All Quran courses will be linked to the Presidency of Religious Affairs. [The measure 
was aimed to prevent the religious education in early ages.] 
3. All activities of Sufi orders (Tariqahs) will be terminated. 
4. The dressing code will be applied without any concessions. [Referring to the headscarf 
issue] 
5. Restrictions will be imposed on green capital. [Referring to MUSIAD members86” 
Erbakan refrained from open confrontation with the military officials during the meeting 
and behaved in a more compromised manner. Yet, he refused to sign the final document and 
asked for further discussion on the stated issues. And more interestingly, although Erbakan did 
not sign the document, the final draft of the 28 February NSC was passed out to the major media 
organs by the military. 
• Milliyet (a mainstream secular newspaper): Fine-tuning to the regime 
• Cumhuriyet (a mainstream secular newspaper close to CHP): The WP makes 
difficulties 
• Tansu Ciller: Nobody should expect democracy to be interrupted. Turkish 
military is the guardian of our democracy, and we are the warranty of secularism. 
The WP should not take advantage of religious values and use them for political 
purposes. 
• The Secretariat of the NSC: Sanctions will be imposed if the measures are not 
implemented. 
Erbakan, on the other hand, visited other party leaders during this period and sought for 
support regarding the NSC decisions. His efforts were fruitless. 
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• Mesut Yilmaz (The leader of the ANAVATAN): I told Erbakan that the 
interlocutor of your concerns was the NSC, not ANAVATAN party. If you were 
not happy with the final decisions, you should have told so during the NSC 
meeting. 
• Bulent Ecevit: If you cannot accept this state with its fundamental principles such 
as secularism and democracy at this time, you will have to take the risk of being 
apart from the government for a while. 
• The Secretary General of the NSC: We are not in accordance with Erbakan. 
• Erbakan: The media is making up stories regarding the relationship between the 
WP and the military. 
• A number of NGOs (including the workers’ unions) gave their support to the NSC 
decisions. 
• Tansu Ciller: The measures will undoubtedly be implemented. 
5 March 1997 Erbakan finally signed the NSC decisions of 28 February. 
March-April-June 1997 The military briefings on political reaction increased. 
21 May 1997 The Attorney-general of the Supreme Court of Appeals commenced a 
closure case against the Welfare Party claiming that the Party became the focus of the 
reactionary movements. The Attorney General described the members of the WP as “blood-
sucking vampires” and “malign tumors,” and used the statements of Sukru Karatepe, Sevki 
Yilmaz, and Hasan Huseyin Ceylan as evidence. It was the first closure case commenced against 
the governing party. 
7 June 1997 The General Staff put an embargo on the firms that were accused of being 
involved in reactionary movements by the military. 
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10 June 1997 It was announced during a briefing “Turkish army [was] determined to 
prevent any domestic or foreign enemy by military force based on its duties on the Article 35 of 
the Inner Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces.” Among the audience was the judges and 
prosecutors of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeals, and the Council of State. 
18 June 1997 Due to the several resignations from his coalition partner DYP, Erbakan 
had to resign from his post. While announcing his resignation, Erbakan emphasized that his 
motive for this declaration was to convey the PM chair to Tansu Ciller, his coalition partner. 
19 June 1997 Instead of fulfilling the wishes of Erbakan, President Suleyman Demirel 
asked Mesut Yilmaz, who did not have a parliamentary majority, to form the new government. 
30 June 1997 Yilmaz formed the ANASOL-D government with Bulent Ecevit’s DSP, 
Husamettin Ozkan’s DTP (Democratic Turkey Party). 
16 Ocak 1998 the Constitutional Court closed The Welfare Party and banned the leader 
cadre of the WP from politics for five years. 
6.2.THE AKP AND THE 27 APRIL MILITARY MEMORANDUM  
22 April 1998 Tayyip Erdogan had to a ten-month prison sentence (of which he served 
six months) for reciting a poem in Siirt in December 1997. The poem was regarded as an 
incitement to commit religious or racial hatred under Article 312/2 of the Turkish Penal Code. It 
included verses translated as "The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the 
minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers...." The conviction also stipulated a political 
ban, which prevented him from participating in parliamentary elections.  
14 August 2001 The Justice and Development Party was established by the reformist 
wing of the former Welfare cadres. 
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June 2002 Bulent Ecevit (PM of the coalition government of DSP-MHP-ANAP): Early 
elections could create a regime problem.  
12 November 2002 Bulent Ecevit: A future AKP government will cause problems for the 
secular democratic regime.  
12 May 2002 An interrogation was initiated on the assets of Erdogan.  
23 October 2002 The Attorney-General of the Supreme Court of Appeals commenced a 
closure case against the AKP on the basis that “Due to his political ban, Erdogan could not be the 
leader of the AKP.” 
• Erdogan: Turkish democracy was hurt once more.  
22 November 2002 The AKP won a landslide victory in 2002 general elections with 
34.28% vote share.  
• TUSIAD: The AKP is an opportunity for economic and political stability and for 
economic and social transformation that the country had been longing for.  
25 June 2003 Deniz Baykal stated that the AKP might have other motives under the EU 
membership veil.  
19 July 2003 The sixth reform package, which abolished article 8 of Anti-Terror Law 
and allowed for broadcasting in languages and dialects other than Turkish, was introduced.  
• Hilmi Ozkok (The Chief of Staff): We have some concerns. The package should be 
discussed at NSC first. Broadcasting in languages other than Turkish is separatism, and 
abolishment of article 8 of Anti-Terror Law will encourage terrorists.  
• An anonymous military official to Hurriyet: The time of watching the government is 
over. We are extremely uncomfortable. 
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• Cumhuriyet: Young military officials are nervous. (Referring to a well-known phrase of 
27 May 1960 military coup) 
• 22 May 2003 Milliyet (newspaper): Contending that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and 
Kemalizm is an obstacle to Turkey’s EU membership means that independent, 
democratic, secular, and unitary Turkey is an obstacle to EU accession.  
• Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat (Vice President of the AKP group in the parliament): I do not 
believe that the Secretary of the NSC has the authority to warn the government. 
(Referring to the earlier demands of the military to discuss the issue at the NSC) 
• After the completion of the reform package, the Government sent it to the President 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer for approval. The President instead returned the package to the 
Parliament for further discussion and had to sign it after the second round.  
7 August 2003 The seventh reform package was put into effect. The package brought 
about significant changes concerning the role of the National Security Council. “As a result of 
this reform, the NSC became an advisory board responsible to the prime minister and its 
secretary-general was divested of his executive and supervisory powers,” (Ugur & Yankaya, 
2008, p.591). 
3 November 2003 The government finished working on a resolution, which granted 
more autonomy to local administration via decentralization87. Before presenting the resolution to 
the Parliament, the AKP government asked for the opinion of the military and the President on 
the reform. The resolution was brought to the Parliament only after all the changes asked for 
incorporated into the text. 
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• The CHP: Demanded the immediate withdrawal of the resolution, which they claimed, 
were degrading the fundamental principles of the Republic88.  
5 November 2003 The European Commission published its regular progress report on 
Turkey’s performance regarding the Copenhagen criteria. The Commission welcomed the 
reforms, but also highlighted the weaknesses in the implementation.  
28 March 2004 The AKP increased its vote share from 34.28% to 41.67% and declared 
another victory in the 2004 local elections.  
24 April 2004 After Rauf Denktas, the President of Northern Cyprus, was finally 
persuaded the Cyprus referendum based on Annan Plan took place. The referendum resulted in 
the majority Greek Cypriot population voting down the UN Plan (75.38% against), whereas the 
minority Turkish Cypriot population (including the settlers from Turkey who outnumbered them) 
voted for the Plan (64.91% in favor). The controversy over the Annan Plan and the future of the 
Cyprus issue was the topic of the conversation all over Turkey. 
• Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Insisting on a deadlock is not a solution. (Referring to the official 
state policy of Turkey and Northern Cyprus, that applies “no solution – preserving the 
status quo” as the solution to the Cyprus problem.” 
• Deniz Baykal (the leader of the CHP): Cyprus no more. If the plan becomes active, the 
Turkish side of the island will become Greek in 20 years. Who in the world is Erdogan 
trying to make up to? 
• Hilmi Ozkok (The Chief of Staff): Cyprus is not only about Turkic Cypriots. Turkey’s 
security is at stake.  
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• Tuncay Ozilhan (The President of TUSIAD): The solution of the Cyprus problem should 
be based on Annan plan.  
• Ali Bayramoglu (The President of MUSIAD): Annan Plan is not right for the Northern 
Cyprus. Turkey is using Anna Plan to be able to get into the EU. 
7 May 2004 The AKP government responded with additional reforms, which addressed a 
number of issues such as “human rights, annulment of remaining death penalty provisions, 
strengthening the gender equality, broadening the freedom of press, abolishment of the State 
Security Courts, and establishment the supremacy of international agreements over national 
legislation in the area of fundamental freedoms,” (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.592). 
14 July 2004 The AKP government introduced the eight-reform package, which replaced 
the military representatives in civilian bodies such as the RTUK, YOK and TRT with civilians.   
• Pekin Baran (Vice President of TUSIAD): AKP had demonstrated an astonishing 
performance. Contrary to the common expectations, they did not take any wrong steps 
informed either by their Islamic identity or by their economic preferences.  
September 2004 During the discussions of reform in the Turkish Penalty Code, the AKP 
government included a clause in the draft bill to criminalize adultery, which only to be pulled 
back after drawing heavy oppositions.   
• Erdogan: The bill is necessary for gender equity and is meant to protect wives from 
cheating husbands. 
• Günter Verheugen, (European commissioner for enlargement): This bill will tarnish 
Turkey’s image. 
• Domestic media repeatedly reported the foreign reactions.  
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• Hurriyet: The course of the incidents is becoming scary89. 
• Deniz Baykal: The clause will absolutely harm the unity of the family. What will happen 
to those who are living in Anatolia with a religious marriage?   
• CHP: Even if the gender equity is sustained in this clause, accepting adultery as a 
criminal act means going backward. Turkey abolished such clauses from its codes eight 
years ago.  
• TUSIAD: Adultery is a moral problem, not a criminal one.  
• MUSIAD: Adultery must be a crime.  
22 October 2004 The Human Rights Commission, responsible to the office of Prime 
Minister published a minority report and offered “Turkiyeli (from Turkey)” as an alternative 
supra nationality to “Turk.” 
• Deniz Baykal: Initiating a discussion on the borders of Turkey that were drawn with the 
Lausanne Agreement and creating artificial minorities are fruitless attempts90.  
• The Deputy Chief of Staff: Initiating a discussion on the unitary of Turkish state cannot 
be accepted by the Turkish army91.   
• President Ahmet Necdet Sezer: In a unitary state, nation, country and sovereignty cannot 
be divided. The founding element of Turkish Republic is single , and it is Turks92. 
• The AKP: An intellectual provocation93. The government did not ask for such a report.  
7 December 2004 The Municipality Law 5272 entered into force. The law granted the 
municipalities with the authority to aggregate alcohol-serving restaurant in a district outside the 
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public sphere. In order to clear away the confusion, Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a circular 
and confirmed the Law 5272 on 17 December 2005.  
• Deniz Baykal: Prohibiting alcohol is the first step towards becoming the next Taliban or 
the Saudi Arabia94.  
• Hurriyet: Alcohol Ghetto95 
• Erdogan: There is no such thing as alcohol prohibition. We consider the issue in terms of 
public health. 
12 August 2005 In a historic meeting in Diyarbakir, Erdogan announced that there is a 
“Kurdish problem” in the country, and the only solution to this problem was more democracy. It 
was not confined to a limited group of people. It was the problem of all.96 
27 November 2005 During a meeting in Siirt, Erdogan stated that Turkey is a mosaic, 
which consists of different parts. In a country full of sub-nationalities, Turkish citizenship is the 
supra nationality of all.  
• Deniz Baykal: You must have your peace with the phrase “Turkish nation.” You must not 
be ashamed of using the word Turk.  
Early May 2006 Cumhuriyet (which literally means “the Republic”) newspaper launched 
a campaign for the upcoming presidential elections on 16 May 2007. The campaign consisted of 
multiple short videos and newspaper ads on the “threat” Turkey faced. Some of the campaign 
slogans were “Are you aware of the danger?” “On 16 May, clocks will be put 100 years back,” 
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“Women of Republic are being destroyed,” and at the end of each video, the newspaper 
demanded from the society to protect their Republic97. 
5 and 11 May 2006 There was a bomb attack to Cumhuriyet newspaper, which is known 
for its secular stance and closeness to the CHP.  
17 May 2006 There was an armed attack on the Council of State, which was famous for 
its decisions on the headscarf issue. It was reported that during the attack, the aggressor 
screamed, “Allah is great! (Allahuekber),” and warned that more attacks would follow98.   
• On May 18th, a group marched to Anitkabir (The mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk). 
The group consisted of members of the Constitutional Court, Council of State, Supreme 
Court of Appeals, Chamber of Accounts, Courts of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and 
Supreme Administrative Court for the Armed Forces as well as representatives of Turkish 
Bar Association, prosecutors, university rectors, and academicians. The slogan of the 
group was “Turkey is secular and will remain so.” 
• President Ahmet Necdet Sezer: The attack is a black mark in Turkish history. These 
attackers are against the values and institutions that are guarantors of an independent, free 
and modern lifestyle. They will never reach their goals99.  
• The AKP: It is obviously a provocation.  
• Erdogan: I curse the attack. It was aimed at the institutions of the Republic as a whole. 
• Deniz Baykal: It is not an individual payoff. Our constitution was at target. The 
responsibility of the government is absolute.  
• Hilmi Ozkok (The Chief of Staff): As the representative of the military forces, I condemn 
this nefarious attack. 
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Early April 2007 It was announced that the birthday of Prophet Mohammad (Kutlu 
Dogum) (which is accepted as a sacred day by Muslims) would be celebrated on April 23rd. April 
23rd was also the day when the Turkish National Great Assembly was founded, and Ataturk 
created the national celebration for the National Sovereignty and Children’s Day. 
• Cumhuriyet: The AKP government ordered the presidents (of Ministry of National 
Education) to be at present at Kutlu Dogum celebrations100. (Later, a conservative 
newspaper –Yenisafak- proved that Cumhuriyet changed the original document and 
published the fake one101.) 
• Hurriyet: April 23rd Provocations. A Quran recitement competition will be held at the 
very same gymnasium that has been used for the April 23rd celebrations for years102.   
• Cumhuriyet: Kutlu Dogum week, which has been celebrated since 1989, has been turned 
into a show103.  
• Hurriyet: Kutlu Dogum is purposely being celebrated on April 23rd. The purpose is to 
make small children and student efface the terms such as national sovereignty, patriotism 
and being Turkish and rather learn religious concepts104. 
11 April 2007 Deniz Baykal: I believe that Prime Minister Erdogan will break the 
good news that he is not going to stand as a candidate in the presidential elections.  
12 April 2007 The Chief of Staff Yasar Buyukanit shared his opinions on the 
upcoming presidential election and stated “After the elections, I hope a president who is loyal 
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-not only in discourse but also in heart -to the fundamental principles of the republic, the 
unitary, secular and democratic structure of the state will be elected  
14 April 2007 President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (during his speech in the military 
academy): Islamic fundamentalist threat Turkey faces today is higher than ever. 
14 April 2007 -13 May 2007 “Society became polarized regarding the issue, and 
meetings were held in major cities with the participation of hundreds of thousands, mostly 
claiming to protect secular political structure,” (Warhola & Bezci, 2010). 
18 April 2007 Arzuhan Yalcindag (The president of TUSIAD): I feel that Erdogan 
will not stand as a candidate in the presidential election. 
24 April 2007 Erdogan announced in a group meeting that AKP’s candidate for 
presidential elections would be Abdullah Gul105. Gul’s wife was wearing a headscarf, and 
this fact spurred a huge debate. Headscarf in Cankaya was just unacceptable106. 
27 April 2007 The AKP failed to achieve a majority of 367, and Gul's candidacy 
failed in the first round despite a majority of those present voting in favor (361 votes). A 
majority of 367, on the other hand, was not a constitutional requirement107. Yet, the CHP 
insisted on the 367 and applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the first 
round of the presidential election. The Court was to reach a decision during the weekend.  
27 April 2007 Later in the evening, Turkish Armed Forces released a statement in its 
website warning that "...The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is 
focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent 
situation. ... the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in these arguments and remains the 
absolute defender of secularism..."  
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28 April 2007 Cemil Cicek (The spokesperson of the AKP): “It is unthinkable that in 
a state governed by the rule of law, the Turkish General Staff (TGS), which is as an 
institution under the Prime Minister, would speak against the government. The TGS is an 
institution under civilian governmental command, and its duties and responsibilities are 
defined by the constitution. According to our Constitution, the Chief of Staff is responsible to 
the Prime Minister in terms of his stated duties and authorities” (Warhola & Bezci, 2010). 
• Mustafa Ozyurek (The spokesperson of the CHP): This is surely a military 
memorandum. The government should act accordingly. 
• Onur Oymen (Vice President of the CHP): We 100% share the military’s views. We 
will not surrender Turkey to the enemies of Ataturk. 
• Onder Sav (The Secretary of the CHP): It is time to be happy for us! It is time to be 
happy for Turkey! 
• Arzuhan Yalcindag (The President of TUSIAD): General elections must be held 
immediately in order to protect secularism and democracy. 
• Liberals: Done right before the presidential election, statements of Turkish General 
Staff is not innocent. 
• MUSIAD was one of the first groups to oppose the e-memorandum108. 
• 28 April 2007 Caglayan Republic protest was held.  
• Cumhuriyet: This is civil memorandum109. 
• Vatan: And this is the civil memorandum110.  
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• Hurriyet: The military has fulfilled the first stage of its duties. Initiating the 27 April 
process comforted millions111.  
• Hurriyet: Those who wish to have a modern and civilized lifestyle are trying to block 
those who wish to return back to Dark Ages112.  
• Hurriyet: It was the duty of Turkish General Staff to say “no!” to what was 
happening113.  
• Zaman (a prominent conservative newspaper): It is apparently a democracy quiz for 
Turkey. 
29 April 2007, Deniz Baykal There will be clashes if the Constitutional Court decides 
the unconstitutionality of the majority 367. 
1 May 2007 The Constitutional Court announced its decision on the majority of 367 and 
supported the CHP stance. 
1 May 2007 The AKP government announced that early elections would be held 
immediately.  
11 May 2007 The Parliament accepted the constitutional amendment that cleared the path 
for presidential elections via referendum. 
• Deniz Baykal: The amendment is an example of absolute irresponsibility. 
• Tayyip Erdogan: How can those who see the election of the Turkish president by popular 
vote as a problem for the regime ask votes from the people? 
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22 July 2007 The early elections, which had a turnout rate of 84.24%, resulted in yet 
another landslide victory of the AKP. The vote share of the Party in the Kurdish region also 
increased from 32.2% to 54.6%114.  
• Abdullah Gul: The election results are obviously a message regarding the presidential 
elections.  
28 August 2007 In the third round of the election, Abdullah Gul was elected president by 
the Parliament with 337 votes.  
7. CONCLUSION 
While contemporary research on the political success in semi-democratic countries 
focuses primarily on the election victories, the findings of this study indicates that election 
success may change governments, but does not necessarily change the existing power structure. 
Therefore, with a focus on the governments of Welfare Party and the Justice and Development 
Party of Turkey, this study argues that in addition to election victories, shifting the balance of 
power in one’s favor is also a significant aspect of the process, namely reining in the power of 
the authoritarian structures. 
The findings of this study indicate that discourse plays a significant role.  In the same line 
with the studies of Bermeo (1992) and Cavdar (2006); my findings suggest that he usage of a 
more moderate, inclusive and compromiser language helps political parties to appeal different 
segments of the society. On the other hand, exclusive and radical discourses estrange some of the 
groups in the society and create a perception of threat among those that do not share the same 
values with the political party. For example, Welfare Party’s insistence on Islam as the sole 
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reference point for its political agenda and its hatred toward the West hindered its relationship 
with some of the most dominant power centers in the Turkish society, such as TUSIAD. At the 
same time, such attitude towards the West in addition to the Party’s stance on secularism created 
were perceived as a threat to the regime by Kemalist state structure and moderate citizens. 
On the other hand, the findings also suggest that appealing to a group with a moderate 
agenda is not sufficient in and of itself. Joel Migdal’s (2001) “State in Society” approach, which 
differs from traditional views on state and its relations with the society, explains this 
phenomenon with differentiating between power centers in the society and their utility functions. 
Accordingly, a political party that aims to appeal to a power center should pay attention to its 
utility function and try to convince the center that it will be incorporated into the utility function 
of the party. The AKP’s group-specific policy strategy is a good example of this coalition 
building. The Party offered identity recognition and cultural rights to Kurds, EU membership and 
a stable economy to TUSIAD, promotion of small and medium-sized firms and closer economic 
and political relations with alternate power centers in global politics to MUSIAD, a solution to 
the oppression towards Muslim population to conservatives, and a more democratic, human 
rights oriented country to the liberals. This coalition, in turn, played a significant role in critical 
junctures when the tension between the Party and Kemalist state structure increased. The power 
centers in the coalition showed their support for the AKP through ballot boxes, media, and their 
statements.  The Welfare Party, on the other hand, depending solely on conservatives and 
MUSIAD, lacked the necessary support and had to fight with the Kemalist structure alone. 
Third, the findings suggest that a source of legitimacy –either domestic or foreign- that is 
accepted by most of the society is important for institutionalization of the change in the balance 
of power.  In Turkish case, this was the EU membership, or specifically the EU conditionality. 
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Initiated by the Kemalist elites back in 1960s, the EU process granted the AKP with the 
necessary means to find a scapegoat for radical reforms, which eventually led to limiting the 
authority of Turkish military on civil institutions. The WP, on the other hand, wanted to make 
use of Islam, which has been one of the most (perceived) threatening enemies of the Kemalist 
state besides separatism. In other words, the reference point of the Welfare Party was a threat to 
the Kemalist state and any policy that refers back to that reference point was used as an 
opportunity to attack the government, even though the policy was in accordance with the state 
interests. 
As for the limitations of the findings, it should be noted that electronic archives are of 
limited availability in Turkey, which obstructs reaching the data. A field study on this interesting 
question might reveal different aspects of the phenomenon that has been the subject of this study. 
Moreover, this study lumps some of the power centers together and misses the nuances among 
them. Future research might look deeper into different groups within the conservatives or liberals 
to be able to assess the political struggle and their relationship with the AKP more accurately. 
Finally, the findings of this study have direct implications outside of Turkey. Defeating 
authoritarian regimes -transition to democracy- has long been debated among scholars of 
democratization. The sharp -yet smooth- balance of power change in Turkish politics in recent 
years might shed light onto the path of other illiberal democracies that have a powerful 
authoritarian actor, or those that have a limited democratic setting. In a region with burgeoning 
electoral success of Islamist parties in the fall of authoritarian leaders one after another, the AKP 
experience could also be used as a reference point by the optimists to show that the political 
agenda of the Islamist parties could be shaped, contained, and transformed by the broad social 
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coalition they depend to survive, which eventually helps them weaken the authoritarian 
structures that are strongly rooted in these countries. 
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